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INTRODUCTION. 
The proposition that the Soviet Union has used its sizeable fishing fleet to 
pursue more than just creatures of the marine environment is neither new nor, it 
would seem, alarming. Common reactions to the USSR's fishing activities have 
tended to render such concerns unimportant or nonsensical. The first result 
(unimportance) arises when the perceived threat of Soviet fishing is seen by most as 
at or near zero. The second (nonsensical) occurs when the few see every fishing 
vessel as a fully fledged intelligence collector cum warship and every crew member 
as a dedicated naval operative. Somewhere in between these inaccurate portrayals of 
the strategic applications of Soviet fisheries lies the true story. 
This sub-thesis examines Soviet fishing activities in the South Pacific region, 
with particular referep.ce to New Zealand, Australia, Vanuatu and Kiribati. In the past, 
commentators have tended to focus solely on the immediate military implications of 
Soviet fishing access to the region. It is hoped that the following chapters will 
broaden this perspective. Attention is paid to the longer term, political objectives 
which explain Soviet fisheries proposals and operations. Each chapter establishes the 
• 
Soviet record, both in negotiations and at sea, and then discusses the security and 
wider political implications which follow. 
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CHAPTER 1: TRENDS IN SOVIET FISHING ACfIVITIES: MILITARY 
APPLICA TrONS OF THE SOVIET FISHING FLEET AND THE MOVE TO 
THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE 
Before the record of the Soviet fishing fleet in the South Pacific is considered, 
it is necessary to place the developments in this region during the 1970s and 1980s in 
their proper context. This chapter describes the general objectives pursued by Soviet 
fishing activities on a global scale, taking as its basis an earlier coverage of the topic 
by the author!. Particular reference is made to the intelligence collection and wartime 
roles of the fishing fleet. The emphasis then moves to the growing importance of 
southern hemispheric fisheries to the Soviet Union. 
The first and most obvious duty of the Soviet fishing fleet is to provide a much 
needed source of protein for the considerable Soviet population. The potential is 
enormous. Soviet fishing operations are based around the world's largest fleet of 
approximately 3,600 vessels (for a total of 6.5 million gross registered tonnes2), 
ranging from small, rugged trawlers operating in coastal waters to large, deep-water 
factory fishing vessels and mother ships. 
I 
Even in relation to this legitimate sphere of Soviet fisheries there are hints of 
a hidden agenda. Davidchik and Mahoney have described claims that seafood 
supplies one third of the animal protein consumed in the Soviet Union as 'outside the 
realm of the possible'3. The first explanation for the divergence between the results 
(in terms of consumable catch) and efforts (in terms of geographical coverage) of the 
Soviet fishing fleet does not tell the full story. The inefficiencies which have 
characterized the Soviet fishing effort4 do account in part for the excessive efforts and 
huge geographical coverage of the fishing fleet, but they cannot explain why Soviet 
fishing vessels have entered and remained in areas where fish stocks are known to be 
poor or nonexistent. 
The second explanation, that the fishing fleet serves additional, (non-
commercial) aims of the Soviet state has drawn attention to the military applications 
of Soviet fishing activities. These can be divided into two main areas of effort: 
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intelligence collection facilitated by Soviet fishing vessel access; and wartime 
support. 
The role of Soviet state interests. 
The potential for intelligence collection of a minor, ad hoc sort, lies with any 
merchant or fishing vessel plying the oceans of the world todaY5• There are also 
possible wartime roles (eg supplying combat vessels) for non-Soviet fishing fleets. 
What separates Soviet efforts in this field from those of other states is the 
organizational structure which is able to control and set demands on the fishing fleet 
under its de facto jurisdiction. 
Like all officially recognized units of Soviet government, Soviet fisheries are 
subordinate to the state. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov stated in 1976 that; 'maritime 
transportation, fishing and scientific research on the sea are part of the Soviet Union's 
naval might'6. Thus the vast Soviet fishing fleet serves as part of the overall drive for 
sea power. However, sea power in itself is not the determinant in the last instance. 
f 
The basic presumption is the overall interest of the state. Solie has provided the 
following description of this distinctly Clausewitzian frame of reference: 'In this 
strategy, the navy is the most important single instrument [of sea power] but 
commercial shipping, fishing and research are also significant elements wrapped into 
a joint economic and military principle with the promotion of Soviet state interest as 
its primary goal'7. 
This is not to say that the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries is merely a puppet of 
the military complex with absolutely no control over fishing fleet activities. As 
Jacobsen writes: 'The civilian fleets have clearly not been organizationally, 
structurally integrated with the navy proper. They each have functionally autonomous 
administrative structures, whose ongoing concerns focus on the attainment of civilian 
tasks, and on the successful meeting of economic plan quotas and requirements's. 
Rather, embodied within Soviet fisheries operations at all levels (from the highly 
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bureaucratized Ministry of Fisheries down to the equipment carried on Soviet fishing 
vessels) are points of integration for military objectives and for the pursuit of overall 
Soviet national interests. 
From this perspective it becomes all too easy to conclude that any Soviet 
fishing vessel presence which cannot be justified on commercial grounds, must have 
compensating military applications of a direct nature. This is not necessarily so. The 
Soviet Union may enter into a fisheries agreement which makes neither commercial 
nor military sense. But overall Soviet interests may still be judged as likely to benefit. 
The latter can range from the establishment of a line of communication with a small 
state, to longer term calculations of political and or strategic advantage and influence. 
What is certain, though, is that the supposed irrationality and clumsiness of the Soviet 
Ministry of Fisheries serves as a convenient screen for the fundamental interests of 
the Soviet state. 
The counter-argument, that in these days of perestroika and openness Soviet 
fishing vessels are vehicles for purely commercial operations, can be equally 
fallacious. The record is undeniable (despite continued Soviet claims of innocence). 
! 
Intelligence collection by Soviet fishing vessels and crews is coordinated by the First 
Division of the Intelligence Directorate (RU or Razvedyvatel 'noye Upravleniye), 
which is to be found attached to each fleet of the Soviet Navy9. 
Intelligence and wartime tasks. 
Vladimir Lysenko, a former captain of Soviet fishing and merchant vessels 
has described the intelligence gathering tasks of the fishing fleet as follows: detection 
of submarine traces by the fishing vessel's active echo-sounders and the relaying of 
such data in encoded form to Soviet Naval Intelligence; recording port alterations, 
ship arrivals, departures and sightings of foreign warships; and the handing over of 
the remains of military equipment trawled from the sea bottom10• He notes that 'it was 
part of our duties to observe the defence systems of Western countries, to test the 
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possibility of "eavesdropping" on the signals automatically transmitted by underwater 
orientation buoys, and we were given special assignments to gather hydrological 
infonnation on inshore sealanes and the entrances to foreign ports'll. 
While a great deal of Soviet ocean-based intelligence collection is carried out 
. 
by dedicated AGI (Auxiliary General Intelligence or Korabl Razbedki) vessels, the 
merchant and fishing fleets have been used extensively for the same purpose. For 
example, in 1976, no less than three accusations were made by Western governments 
regarding the involvement of Soviet fishing vessels in intelligence gathering12. 
Moreover, the growing sophistication, size and annament of the AGI fleet in recent 
years13, does not suggest that fishing vessel-based collection has come to an end. 
Recent concern that Soviet non-naval vessels could spy on the Seventh Fleet if 
Philesco (Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corp.) was allowed to service 
socialist-flag ships at strategically important Subic Bay, forced the plan to be blocked 
in the Philippine Govemmentl4. There is no doubting that Soviet fishing vessels 
(whether in Europe, America or Australasia) are still kept under scrutiny by Western 
security organization~. 
I 
But the intelligence collection efforts of Soviet fisheries do not stop at the 
designated ports used by Soviet vessels. Land-based Soviet fisheries personnel are 
also involved. The Soviet Union's Office of Fisheries in the United States provides 
cover for both the KGB and GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye or the 
Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff)l5, as does Morflot, the 
Soviet Shipping Company16. The same can be said for the Singapore Soviet Shipping 
Company (SOCIAC)l7. This is relevant to negotiations in the late 1980s: Singapore is 
the current servicing site for vessels proposed to enter New Zealand and/or Australian 
ports under agreements sought by the Soviet Union (See Ch.2 and Ch.5). In February 
1982, Aleksandr Bondarev, a Soviet marine superintendent overseeing repairs to 
Soviet vessels at a Singapore shipyard, was expelled on charges of espionage18• 
Human Intelligence and Signals Intelligence missions, though, are not the only 
military applications of the Soviet Union's fishing fleet and related institutions. Soviet 
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fishing vessels and crews would certainly have some role in times of war. This would 
not only include the upgrading of the intelligence collection role (ie collection of 
information on and detecting Western submarines and other combatants19). It is to be 
expected that fisheries vessels would disrupt Western attempts to control Soviet 
vessel activity in important ocean areas and choke points2o. They would also engage 
in the provision of logistics, communication and other support to Soviet naval 
vessels21 . The latter applies particularly to the support ships (tankers,etc) which 
normally accompany even the smallest scale of Soviet fishing operations. These 'have 
in the past provided support to submarines and still do on an emergency basis'22. 
According to Polmar, 'the fishing fleet includes a large number of research ships, 
tankers, and refrigerated fish carriers that could be pressed into naval service in 
wartime, all controlled through an extensive and centralized communications 
system'23. This centralized guidance would be effected via KGB and other personnel 
onboard Soviet fishing vessels24, whose peacetime tasks of "chaplaincy" for the 
Soviet crew and of keeping an eye on foreign observers onboard could be expanded 
considerably in crisis or war. 
It can be argued with some justification that the combat capabilities of old, 
delapidated Soviet trawlers are negligible at best and that Soviet fishing crew 
members are more interested in purchasing American running shoes than in tracking 
US aircraft cai-rier groups. But the wartime applications of Soviet fishing operations 
are still cause for concern in the late 1980s. After the fishing agreement between the 
(Danish Territory of the) Faroes Islands was renewed recently, one report cited the 
fears of NATO analysts 'that the fishing fleet and the Russians supervising the repair 
work might fonn a task force which, in a crisis, could take control of the Faroes 
before NATO could react'25. It would not be hard to envisage this scenario involving 
the transfer of Soviet Spetsnaz (Spetsial'naya Naznacheniya or Special Purpose) 
operatives via fisheries auspices and vessels. Each Soviet naval fleet has a brigade 
sized (700 to 900 men) naval Spetsnaz force which comes under the direction of the 
6 
intelligence directorate of the fleet and includes a minisubmarine group amongst other 
speciali ti es26• 
In negotiations, the Soviet Union also tends to request access for the national 
airline, Aeroflot, as part of the overall fisheries package. Aeroflot is involved in a 
range of clandestine activities which parallel and complement those of the fishing 
fleet. These range from military intelligence gathering from flights over sensitive 
areas to the use of Aeroflot aircraft to airlift military supplies and the use of Aeroflot 
offices overseas as covers for KGB and GRU personnel and operations27• A recent 
defector from the USSR has estimated that half of the Tokyo Aeroflot office staff are 
involved in intelligence collection28 • No wonder, then, that the issue of Aeroflot 
access has been a, if not the, major barrier to a New Zealand agreement with the 
Soviet Union which would pave the way for a fishing vessel servicing facility in the 
former country (see Ch.2). That the USSR has even asked for Aeroflot access to tiny 
Kiribati as one component of a fishing agreement (see Ch.3) is a possible indication 
of the dubious nature of the airline's true role. 
Economic uncertainty. 
" 
But questions over the developments in Soviet fishing do not rest solely upon 
the record of the fishing fleet in supporting Soviet military aspirations. There is 
considerable doubt over the viability, let alone necessity, of Soviet fishing activity in 
many parts of the world. This applies not only to overexploited fisheries in the 
(traditional) northern waters, but also to portions of the South Pacific covered in the 
following chapters of this thesis. 
Soviet interest in fishing agreements with countries of the South Pacific region 
has been manifested in two main forms. First, the Soviet Union has sought access to 
the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones of several South Pacific Island States since 
the mid-late 1970s. Second, there have been a series of Soviet proposals to establish 
servicing facilities in both Australia and New Zealand for fishing vessels operating in 
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grounds outside the respective EEZs of these two countries. 
There are serious doubts over the commercial rationale for each one of these 
schemes. With respect to island state fishing access, the almost complete 
unimportance of the Western Central and Eastern Central Pacific regions to the total 
Soviet fishing effort brings into question the Soviet Union's motives in seeking 
agreements with these countries. For while these areas do form an appreciable 
proportion of world fishing resources (see Table 1.1), Soviet inexpertise in tropical 
fishing has made ventures by Soviet fishing vessels into the region most unprofitable 
(in an economic sense). 
Nonetheless, Soviet marine scientists have (very usefully) provided optimistic 
forecasts of the untapped potential in the world's tuna stock, particularly with respect 
to skipjack tuna in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans29• While these predictions may also 
have stimulated the Soviet tuna fishing effort in the South Pacific, the translation from 
catch potential to performance has not occurred in any sense. As Table 1.2 indicates, 
Soviet catches of the main tuna species found in the South Pacific over the 1983-86 
period were negligible at best. 
The foundation for further Soviet access agreements in the South Pacific may 
, 
appear solid on paper in Soviet marine research academies, but in reality the prospects 
for profitable catch levels by the Soviet fleet are not good. Unless Sovrybflot is 
completely immune to these facts, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there are 
important non-commercial reasons behind the Soviet Union's drive for fishing 
agreements with South Pacific Island States. 
It might be argued that the Soviet proposals for servICIng facilities in 
Australasia are perfectly sensible given the emphasis on southern hemisphere 
fisheries by the USSR. There is no doubting that the move to non-traditional (eg 
South Pacific/Antarctic) fisheries was at least partly stimulated by factors beyond the 
Soviet Union's control. The nearly universal declarations of 200nm EEZs between the 
years 1976 and 1981 brought an end to the unfettered access enjoyed by Soviet 
fishing fleets to traditional grounds in the northern hemisphere. 
8 
Little effort was made however to reduce wastage in the notoriously 
inefficient Soviet catch-to-market process (and thus feed more of the Soviet 
population from reduced quotas). Rather, the number of vessels in the Soviet long-
range fishing fleet was actually increased after 197630! Hence, Soviet reliance on the 
Exclusive Economic Zones of Southern African, South American and other countries 
to the south of the equator has not only been detennined by the marine resource 
policies of northern states, but also by the structure of the Soviet fishing fleet. In 
addition, the enlarged fleet of Soviet super-factory trawlers (of about 4000GRT per 
vessel) has been designed 'for Antarctic fisheries, open-ocean operations including 
fisheries on continental slopes outside the 200 mile limit, and super deep water 
trawling'3!. The South Pacific and adjoining waters are suitable for all of these 
operations. 
The main ql1:estion over Australasian servicing facilities is in regard to the 
geographical proximity of Australia and New Zealand to the main Soviet fishing 
grounds in the region. In regard to Soviet Antarctic fisheries, the main krill and finfish 
stocks are concentrated in the Atlantic Ocean sector of the Antarctic;ie areas close to 
180 degrees from the southernmost points of Australasia32. While McElroy noted in 
, 
1984 that the 'recent growth in the proportion of the Russian krill catch from the 
Indian Ocean sector'33 augured well for the development of support facilities in the 
Australian/NZ area, this trend has not continued. The Indian Ocean sector is not a 
major fishery for either the Soviet (Table 1.3) or other (Table 1.1) fleets. 
It would appear that the Soviet Antarctic fishing effort would be serviced and 
supported more easily and efficiently from Latin American ports, rather than by 
sending vessels steaming all the way to New Plymouth or Hobart. This suggestion 
becomes all the more sensible when the fluctuating levels of the Antarctic catches are 
considered. While an estin1ated 250 to 300 Soviet freezer and factory trawlers were 
responsible for a catch of 400,000 tonnes of krill in Antarctic waters in 198034, 
continued fishing at this level cannot be guaranteed year by year given the threats of 
over-exploitation and pollution to the fragile Antarctic ecosystem35. Finfish fisheries 
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in the Antarctic region may not be too dependable either. Depletion of these stocks by 
overfishing has already forced the USSR to move some of its operations to the 
southeast Pacific outside the Chilean 200nm EEZ36. The future of Soviet Antarctic 
fisheries is also brought into question by the enormous expense involved in operating 
factory trawlers and processing plants in such waters and by the poor meat yield of 
the krill catch37. 
Such unreliability in Soviet Antarctic fisheries suggests that a South 
American servicing facility would be a more practical solution. In this way the huge 
Soviet Southeast Pacific fishing operations could keep the facilities in business, no 
matter what Antarctic catch occurred. As Table 1.3 shows, the west coast of South 
America is an extremely important Soviet fishery which developed rapidly in the late 
1970s following the spread of the "EEZ disease". As a percentage of total world 
catch, the Southeas~ Pacific is sizeable (nearly 15 percent in 1986, Table 1.1), and the 
Soviets have plenty of room to increase their share of this rich fishery; taking less 
than ten percent of the total Southeast Pacific catch in the mid 1980s. 
If the development of Soviet Southeast Pacific fishing operations was to 
depend upon New Zealand (and even further to the west), Australian servICIng 
, 
facilities long passage times would be involved. This does not seem economic. The 
planned level of vessel visits (about 100 a year under the Soviet proposals to both 
New Zealand ' and Australia, see Ch.2 and Ch.5), would probably constitute a very 
small proportion of the total Soviet fleet involved in the Southeast Pacific and the 
diversion of such numbers would hardly seem worth the effort. However Soviet 
vessels also caught 152,000 tonnes of fish in 1986 in the "Southwest Pacific" region 
(see Table 1.3). This may be an indication of Soviet plans to develop deep water 
fishing to the east of the New Zealand EEZ. The world catch in this latter area, 
though, remains negligible ( at less than one percent of the total catch by all fishing 
nations, Table 1.1), and would be unlikely to justify new support facilities in New 
Zealand. 
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The question, then, as to where the New Zealand and Australian-bound Soviet 
vessels will actually be operating is likely to remain clouded until either the USSR 
releases details on the subject or actually gains an Australasian facility and begins 
using it. In terms of the commercial implications of an agreement on port access, it is 
not particularly vital for either Australia or New Zealand to know in advance where 
the vessels using their facilities will be operating. Be it the Antarctic, Southeast 
Pacific or elsewhere, income will be received. But in terms of their own fisheries 
interests and at the strategic level, such knowledge would be critical. At this stage 
doubts over the commercial rationale behind the Soviet servicing proposals make the 
case for being wary of the political and military spinoffs all the more convincing. 
Soviet fishing operations in the regions discussed in this chapter seem to be 
either too distant, too uneconomical, or too unreliable to justify in any complete sense 
fishing agreements with SPISs or servicing facilities in New Zealand or Australia. It 
is hoped that the following chapters will produce a framework within which these 
uncertainties can be clarified . 
.. , 
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CHAPTER 2: NEW ZEALAND. 
Soviet fishing vessels have been operating in New Zealand waters since at 
least 1971 - seven years prior to the declaration of New Zealand's 200nm Exclusive 
Economic Zone and establishment of foreign fishing vessel (FFV) licensing 
agreements. 
New Zealand's fisheries resources and those immediately outside its Exclusive 
EconolIDc Zone, are not such as to ever be a major part of the overall harvest by the 
Soviet worldwide fishing fleet. Hence, the rather high level of interest shown by the 
Soviet Union in developing its fisheries operations around New Zealand raises the 
question of non-fisheries objectives for the fishing fleet. The same can also be said for 
the series of Soviet proposals regarding the establishment in New Zealand of 
servicing facilities for Soviet fishing vessels operating outside the New Zealand EEZ. 
This chapter explores these two main areas of Soviet fishing interest in New Zealand 
and gives an indication as to how Soviet political objectives have been furthered in 
this process. 
, 
Early Soviet fishing activity off New Zealand. 
The first foreign fishing vessels appeared off New Zealand's coasts in 1957, in 
the form of Japanese snapper long-line vessels l , These were followed by Korean and 
Taiwanese vessels. In 1967, the Japanese started trawling for demersal (bottom-
dwelling) fish; four years later the first Soviet vessels arrived, taking 10,400 tonnes of 
hold in their first (recorded) year of operation2• At this tin1e the FFV s were able to 
work all areas outside the twelve mile limit. The 1965 Territorial Sea and Fishing 
Zone Act had established a nine mile fishing zone outside the three mile territorial 
boundary. In 1971 the latter was extended to the full twelve miles3• Such were the 
"restrictions" imposed by New Zealand on foreign fishing activity in these early 
14 
years. 
Soviet catches off New Zealand soon surged as vessels moved to southern 
waters. In 1972 56,800 tonnes of fish were landed and by 1977 (the last year of 
unfettered access), the Soviet catch had reached 123,000 tonnes. Blue whiting, hoki 
and squid were the main contributors. Complaints over Soviet fishing methods were 
quick to surface. One newspaper report listed the charges as follows; 'six-month 
voyages, rarely touching land, disregarding quotas, mesh sizes, even the commercial 
viability of fishing grounds '4. 
Despite these unregulated practices, it is not certain whether New Zealand 
operations were commercially , viable for the Soviet Union. For New Zealand's part, 
" 
Soviet fishing in the pre-licensing days brought few benefits. Port tax for fishing 
vessels was introduced in 1976 and there were foreign currency earnings from 
berthage, bunkering and storage facilities under New Zealand's open port policy. But 
these provisions applied mainly to the Japanese fleet. Soviet fishing vessels received 
supply and bunkerage offshore from their own fisheries support vessels. The Soviet 
fleet was based in Nadhodka, 200 miles east of Vladivostok, and most of the fish and 
squid caught were offloaded in Singapore.s 
New Zealand's ability to control and respond. 
Concern over the vulnerability of a finite and largely unprotected resource to 
exploitation by foreign harvestors was underlined by the lack of knowledge of actual 
foreign fishing vessel activities. As an example, Bradstock notes that before the EEZ 
declaration, 'Soviet catch data was only available through the United Nation's FAO 
Annual Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, which gave no breakdown of species, areas 
fished, and amount of fishing effort, for waters within 200 miles of the New Zealand 
coast'6. 
Indeed New Zealand's knowledge of FFV activity in its own waters was far 
from complete. Recognition of this fact was shown in 1975, when New Zealand 
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began patrols of fishing areas by its small contingent of coastal patrol craft7• A much 
more obvious sign of such concern was the two week survey undertaken by RNZN 
vessels and RNZAF Orions in February 1977. The survey managed to locate 52 
Soviet fishing vessels, (dwarfed by the massive Japanese fleet of 335 vessels). The 
bulk of the Soviet fishing was occurring in southern waters. Twenty-four Soviet 
vessels were found off the South Island's east coast and the same number were found 
east of Auckland Island. Of the 48 Soviet fishing vessels lying within the soon-to-be 
established 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone, forty were trawlers (compared with 37 
at the height of the 1976 season), six were support ships (including one tug) and two 
were research vessels8• An additional indicator of the way New Zealand was being 
taken for granted was the discovery by one of the Orion patrols of a six metre long 
mooring buoy 40km east of Banks Peninsula (in the Christchurch area) which was 
apparently used by. Soviet support vessels for anchorage9• While the buoy may not 
have been cause for strategic concern, it was at least deemed by the Royal New 
Zealand Navy as a menace to navigation. 
A few months later the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries published a 
special supplement to the August edition of Catch (the monthly fisheries journal), 
which gave descriptions and photographs of Soviet and other foreign fishing vessels 
working around New Zealand. It also listed procedures for reporting infringements to 
the 12 mile territorial seas. No less than seven types of Soviet fisheries vessels were 
listed, ranging from the small side trawlers (SSm length, crew of 30) to the huge 
whaling ships (218m, crew of 510). The supplement provided descriptions of the 
distinguishing features and technical details of the vessels, and listed the areas in 
which they operated 10. 
The requirements of resource protection and the need to set up a database for 
the effective monitoring and control for the upcoming EEZ would have been reasons 
alone for the publication of such a supplement. The officer in charge of the above 
survey, Group Captain Hanson RNZAF stated that 'while any ship can be used for a 
number of different purposes, and it is known that intelligence gathering has taken 
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place in other parts of the world, there is no evidence of any such operation in New 
Zealand waters' 11. However, in 1976 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon had claimed 
that that some of the Soviet fishing vessels in New Zealand waters were collecting 
military data12. In addition, the Catch supplement stated that onboard the large Soviet 
stem trawlers operating around New Zealand, there 'may be a large array of aerials 
above the bridge'13. 
Moreover, close attention was being paid by New Zealand officials to the 
activities of the Soviet tug, Besstrashnyj. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
requested 'any information on ... transferring cargo and catches at sea - any unusual 
activities, e.g., movements of the ocean-going tug attending the Russian trawl fleet 
during the 1977 season'14. If the rationale for such a request was silnply to prevent the 
transfer of unacknowledged catches, then why was special mention made of the tug? 
After all, it was thy Soviet "reefer" vessels which were involved in catch transfers, 
whereas the tasks of the tug had been described as follows: 'Helps with towing and at-
sea repair work. Courier between vessels; transfers crews; and carries out other 
assignments under command of fleet master'15. This was no normal fishing fleet 
support vessel. 
. 
The dispatch of Soviet fisheries vessels to New Zealand in the early-mid 
1970s was matched by moves on the diplomatic and other fronts. For example, in 
1972 Soviet observers at the Indo-Pacific Fishing Council in Wellington had 
proposed the use of Soviet research ships by New Zealand scientists16. Regular 
official meetings between New Zealand and Soviet Foreign Ministry and Government 
delegations had been established in that same year; the New Zealand Embassy was 
opened in Moscow at the end of 1973. In early 1975 the New Zealand Labour 
Government received a request from the USSR (presumably during the visit of a 
Soviet parliamentary delegation from 14-22 Apri117) 'seeking repair facilities for their 
vessels in New Zealand ports and permission to replace their New Zealand-based 
crews by air from Russia'18. The newly elected National Government turned down 
this request in May of 197619. 
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The security implications of Soviet fisheries access and activities was of 
obvious concern. Deputy Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Brian Talboys made 
this plain in reference to the Soviet Union's interest in setting up a fishing base in 
Tonga. 'The Leader of the Opposition', he said, 'has admitted that he too would be 
concerned if the USSR set up a base in this area of priority importance to New 
Zealand'2o. Talboys also took the opportunity of the April 1976 visit by a Soviet 
Foreign Ministry delegation to register the Government's disquiet over 'Soviet fishing 
activities around the New Zealand coast'21. (Although, once again, the threat to local 
marine resources alone would have been reason enough to voice such a complaint). 
The New Zealand Minister of Fisheries, J.B.Bolger, then returned the Soviet visit in 
the middle of the following year22. 
The licensing of Soviet vessels and the 1978 Agreement. 
The passage of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Econonuc Zone Act,1977 (in 
September of that year) and, more particularly, its full implementation on 1 April 
1978, l1!arked the turning point in New Zealand's position vis-a-vis foreign fishing 
nations and their vessels. For not only did it bring about a 200nm Exclusive Economic 
Zone off the New Zealand coast, including small islands to the north (Kermadec Is.), 
east (Chathams and Bounty Is.) and south (Auckland and Campbell Is.), it also 
required the presence of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the EEZ to be acknowledged by 
agreements and licensing. Moreover, the extra effort committed to patrolling the zone 
would not only verify adherence to negotiated conditions by the FFV s, it would also 
reduce the chance of non-fishing activities by FFV s going undetected. 
Discussions between New Zealand and Distant Water Fishing Nations over 
access to the new 200nm EEZ began with the visit of a Korean delegation to 
Wellington from 5-7 December 197723. A Soviet delegation undertook negotiations 
on a similar agreement from 14-21 December. A Prime Ministerial press statement of 
8 December announcing the latter talks, raises several issues pertinent to the strategic 
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implications of Soviet fisheries. The statement described the objectives of the Soviet 
Union as follows; 
(i) 'continuing access to the fish resources of the New Zealand zone', 
(ii) 'access to facilities for repair and maintenance of Soviet fishing vessels and the 
right to exchange the crews for these vessels' , and 
(iii) 'a joint venture with a New Zealand finn for the development of the fishing 
industry' (objectives which have remained more or less constant ever since). The 
Prime Minister added the reassurance that 'the Russians have made it clear that they 
are not seeking to establish an exclusive "base" or enclave in New Zealand. What they 
want is access to existing facilities' .24 
" 
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister gave at least veiled attention to the potential 
dangers involved in Soviet fishing vessel access: 'Allowing the Soviet Union access 
to existing shore facilities in New Zealand may involve some problems. The 
Government is prepared to deal with any that may arise'. What he meant was 
surveillance of Soviet vessels and their personnel. But the most telling comment of all 
comes at the end of the statement: 'Any such problems would not be comparable to 
those th,at would have arisen from the establishment by the Soviet Union of its own 
facilities in other parts of the South Pacific'25. With the recent Soviet approach to 
Tonga in mind, the New Zealand Government saw access to its own EEZ and 
facilities as the lesser of two evils. Access to the New Zealand EEZ had more 
legitimacy on a commercial basis. Such reasoning clearly suited the Soviets. They 
were about to secure access to New Zealand's waters and ports and were free to make 
further attractive offers to South Pacific island states. 
Once more on the heels of the Koreans - a fishing agreement between New 
Zealand and South Korea was signed 16 March 197826 - the Soviet Minister of 
Fisheries, Aleksandr Ishkov signed a similar agreement with New Zealand's Foreign 
Affairs Minister Talboys on 4 April 1978, which went into force on that day. 
The Agreement27 consists of twelve Articles and involves the exchange of no 
less than six letters. Of particular relevance are the provisions which, 
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(i) recognize the NZ Government's authority to allocate annually fishing quotas to the 
USSR (Art.III,s.lc), 
(ii) require the Soviet vessels to obtain licenses to pursue those allowable catches 
(III,3), 
(iii) require that Soviet vessels 'allow and assist' boarding by NZ officials and comply 
with instructions from NZ Government employees and platforms (IV,lc,d), and 
(iv) require the Soviets to respond favourably to New Zealand requests for data 
(VIII,2). The onus is, of course, on the Soviet Union to comply with the requirements 
of the host nation. 
New Zealand's major "concessions" (given the concern over further Soviet 
" 
access either by sea or air), are contained in Article IX and confirmed in Letter No.5. 
The New Zealand Government is obliged to enter into negotiations with the Soviet 
Union to consider (~mong other points) the entry, provisioning, refuelling and repair 
in New Zealand ports of Soviet vessels either licensed to fish in the New Zealand 
EEZ or from other areas. Consideration would also be given to the 'replacement of 
their crews by air through flights to and from New Zealand' (IX,ld). The New 
Zealand Government thus has an obligation to consider the 1988 Soviet proposal for 
access which is discussed at length below. Letter No.5 specifies that both air and sea 
access will, or at least could, be liluited to designated ports and airports (the latter via 
designated routes and carriers). The Agreement was originally valid until 30 June 
1982 and was followed on 1 September 1978 by a NZ-Japan fishing agreement28, thus 
fom1img the triad of licensed DWFNs to operate in New Zealand waters. 
Having signed these agreements, the New Zealand Government proceeded to 
allocate quotas from the calculated surpluses (the an10unt of the "Total Allowable 
Catch" not required by domestic operators) to the Distant Water Fishing Nations. 
Quotas are allocated according to fish species and to the areas of the New Zealand 
EEZ. A map giving the eight main subdivisions of the EEZ is given in appendices. 
The DWFNs are then required to submit plans for; 
(i) fishing; the numbers of vessels and, periods of operation, 
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(ii) trans-shipment; the movements of fish carriers and the amount of time to be spent 
in EEZ areas, the sequence of offloading vessels, and 
(iii) supply; the supplies to be brought in by support vessels29• 
Hence, before Soviet or other Foreign Fishing Vessels are licensed and have 
begun fishing within the EEZ, New Zealand authorities have a reasonable idea of the 
scale and location of their operations over the next twelve months. Such intelligence 
is most necessary to respond to concerns over "non-fishing" activities. Another aid to 
EEZ control and enforcement is the requirement for the FFVs to enter port in order to 
be licensed, inspected and identified (by the vessel's international call sign being 
painted on its side30). Any visit to port by a Soviet vessel, however, may pose an 
unnecessary risk. Greater security in one area (checking licensing conditions) may 
involve slightly less security in another. Nonetheless, Soviet access to New Zealand 
ports was restricted ,to vessels entering the EEZ for fishing. Hence it could be claimed 
with some justification that other Soviet activities in the region were not being 
directl y encouraged. 
On New Zealand's part, financial considerations were clearly a driving factor 
in sign~?g the Agreement. The Minister of Fisheries stated in 1978 that New Zealand 
could earn NZ$9,423,OOO from the licensed FFVs if the full quotas were caught, with 
a not inconsiderable $2.9m from Soviet vessels alone, (Japan $S.Sm, Korea $1m31 ). 
At stake were longer term economic considerations as well. Soviet access to New 
Zealand's marine resources would strengthen the overall NZ-USSR trading 
relationship, running strongly in New Zealand's favour32• (Along similar lines the 
New Zealand Government did not open fisheries access negotiations with Japan until 
the latter had agreed to improve conditions for the entry to its markets of New 
Zealand agricultural products33). 
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A series of restrictions on Soviet fishing. 
However, the Soviets were never to repeat their most profitable year of 
operations off New Zealand; 1977 when they took 123,000 tonnes of fish at the cost 
of operating expenses only. Soviet fishing activities in New Zealand waters since that 
time have been punctuated by a series of restrictions. First, New Zealand has reserved 
an increasing proportion of the Total Allowable Catch for domestic vessels, hence 
quotas for Distant Water Fishing Nations have been progressively reduced. As Table 
2.2b shows, the reduction in allocations offered to the Soviet Union was particularly 
harsh in the early years of the scheme. The revenue gained by New Zealand from 
licensed Soviet vessels was reduced from NZ$2.3Sm in the 1979/80 finfish and squid 
years to $970,000 in the 1984/85 years34. This occurred despite significant increases 
in the fee per tonne, rates for both finfish and squid. 
This trend was formalised by a new policy on deepwater trawl fisheries which 
came into effect on 1 April 1983. Access for foreign fleets to prime finfish species 
was to be further restricted (with the exception of Area E) from 1 October 198435. The 
Soviet Union and other Distant Water Fishing Nations were given outlines of this 
, 
plan during a series of bilateral talks in April-May 198436. Along the same lines, the 
1978 agreement with the USSR was extended for just two years in both 1982 and 
198437. As a result, the catch by licensed Soviet vessels as a percentage of the total 
catch in New Zealand waters was reduced to very moderate levels38 by the mid-
1980s. 
Second, Soviet access was limited to mark New Zealand's disapproval of the 
invasion of Afghanistan. New Zealand has thus directly linked policy on Soviet 
fishing access with its assessment of wider strategic matters. Not only was the overall 
Soviet quota reduced (the allocation for finfish dropped from 124,000t for the year 
ending 31 March 1980 to 32,500t for the following season), but Soviet fishing 
activities were restricted to the 'rougher southern waters of area E" 39. 
22 
At the pure fisheries level of the relationship, neither New Zealand nor the 
Soviet Union's interests were inordinately impaired. As Beaglehole notes, New 
Zealand could turn to other Distant Water Fishing Nations if need be and to its 
growing domestic fisheries industry to plug any gaps left by the Soviets4o. The Soviet 
Union not only retained access (albeit at lower catch levels) to the zone in which the 
bulk of its catch had been obtained traditionally, (ie Area E), but 'the expansion of 
NZ-USSR joint-venture fishing enabled the USSR to gain access to other New 
Zealand fishing areas'41. 
Despite these qualifications, Soviet autonomy in fisheries operations decisions 
was reduced. The restriction to Area E can be seen to have a strategic as well as a 
diplomatic message. While Soviet fishing vessels were still able to call at ports further 
to the north (especially at Wellington) the ability to loiter in non-Area E zones was 
reduced. A similar approach can be seen in the treatment of the Soviet missile and 
satellite training ship, the Kosmonaut Gyorgij Dobrovolskij in September 1988. The 
ship, which it was considered would monitor communications signals, was denied 
access to Wellington and redirected to Bluff (the southernmost port on the South 
Island) for refuelling42. 
The prospects for a resumption of less restricted access for Soviet fisheries 
could not have been improved by the record of the USSR's diplomatic activity in 
New Zealand. In 1980, the Soviet Ambassador, Vsevolod Sofinsky was expelled 
when he was found to be passing on funds to a New Zealand political party43. In April 
1987, the fourth ranking Soviet diplomat in New Zealand, Sergei Budnik, was 
expelled on charges that he was a KGB officer and was 'not acting in accord with his 
declared status as a diplomat'44. By the time that the Soviet Union was allowed access 
to other areas of the New Zealand EEZ (for the 1988-89 fishing year), allocations to 
and catches by the Soviet fishing fleet had declined to rather unsubstantiallevelsfc45. 
Indeed, at the tirne of writing the Soviets had not accepted any portion of the 1988-89 
fish allocation offers from the New Zealand Government. 
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As one might expect, restricted access to New Zealand's EEZ and smaller 
allowable catches has been accompanied by a reduction in the number of Soviet 
fishing vessels operating in New Zealand waters. From March 1980 until November 
1982 the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries publication, Catch, included maps 
which indicated the presence of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the New Zealand EEZ. 
The reduction in Soviet trawler numbers is very noticeable; from 40 in February 1977 
(see above) to six in mid-February 198046• All of the latter were operating in Area E. 
At the height of the fishing season in 1981, between ten and twelve Soviet trawlers 
were operating in this southern portion of the EEZ. Throughout that year there was 
almost always at least one Soviet fishing or fishing-related vessel in port. Soviet 
'. 
vessels would enter the New Zealand EEZ in the north-west quadrant before 
proceeding southwards for licensing and fishing. The trans-shipment of catches 
occurred in Pegasus Bay (off Banks Peninsula). Overall, Soviet fishing activities were 
confined to the areas required of them in the post-Afghanistan arrangement; around 
the Auckland and Campbell Islands in the far south of the EEZ. The ports most 
frequently visited by the Soviet fishing fleet were Wellington, Lyttleton 
(Christchurch) and Nelson . 
. 
While at times in the mid-1970s up to forty Soviet trawlers could be found 
operating simultaneously within 200 miles of New Zealand's coasts, throughout the 
whole of 1983 only 23 such vessels fished in those waters. At an average catch of 
little more than 1000t per trawler, this level of activity could not have been 
commercially viable. In 1984, just 21 Soviet trawlers operated in the New Zealand 
EEZ47. 
Soviet fishing activity in the late 1980s. 
It is possible to gauge very accurately Soviet fishing activities in New Zealand 
waters over the past three years thanks to a series of reports published by New 
Zealand's External Assessment Bureau. The very act of their publication giving some 
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indication of the seriousness with which this topic is taken in some quarters. In 
1986,1987 and 1988,25,18 and 18 Soviet fishing vessels respectively, operated under 
license and/ or charter in the New Zealand EEZ 48. These were accompanied by 20,20 
and 12 fisheries associated vessels respectively, as shown in Table 2.4. 
In the 1988 fishing year the continuing reduction in Soviet fisheries activity in 
New Zealand waters is quite marked, even allowing for the fact that operations in 
1986 and 1987 were at modest levels only. The majority of Soviet fishing is carried 
out by Fish Factory Trawler/Freezer vessels, and an increasing number of these are 
being used in charter arrangements with New Zealand companies. Fletcher Fishing is 
an example of the latter. Indeed, since the Soviet Union has not taken up any of the 
\, 
1988/89 allocation, all Soviet fishing activity in NZ waters at the time of writing is 
being carried out by vessels under charter. 
With this tr~nd towards chartered fishing, the port of Nelson tends to be 
favoured over Lyttleton and Dunedin. Yet, Wellington continues to be visited by 
Soviet fishing vessels about 15 times a year (see Table 2.5). Fisheries associated 
vessels (interestingly enough, given the case of the Kosmonaut Georgij Dobrovolskij) 
favoured Wellington as a port in 1988. However, it is clear that if New Zealand 
• 
authorities required further diversions of Soviet vessels away from the capital, there 
would be alternative ports where the Soviets could achieve their official port call 
purpose. Table 2.6 shows that the stated reasons for Soviet vessel port calls have been 
consistent in their frequency over the past three years, especially for licensed and or 
chartered vessels. 
It is somewhat surprising that the number of fisheries research ships visiting 
New Zealand ports has remained constant given the bleak outlook for Soviet fishing 
in New Zealand waters. Table 2.4 also lists visits by Soviet passenger vessels; the 
means by which the Soviet Union presently brings replacement crews into New 
Zealand. One of the major sticking points in negotiations over new forms of Soviet 
vessel access to New Zealand has been the Soviet request to shift crew replacement 
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( 
from sea to air via the Soviet carrier Aeroflot) and it is to this question that this 
chapter now turns. 
Soviet proposals for a servicing facility. 
The 1988 Soviet proposal for servicing vessels which operate outside of New 
Zealand waters in New Zealand ports is the latest in a long line of Soviet requests 
involving the use of Aeroflot for crew transfer purposes. The Soviets have been 
especially persistent on this point since their proposal to have a maintenence, repair 
and servicing facility in Nelson for vessels from the Soviet 'Pacific' fishing fleet49 
was considered by the New Zealand Government in late 1984. The New Zealand 
Prime Minister announced on 7 December 1984 that the request for Aeroflot landing 
rights had been tut:'ned down, and explained that it was not in New Zealand's 
economic or political interests to offer a base for fishing vessels operating outside the 
EEZ. The Government had reviewed the possible economic benefits of the plan 
before making the decision; factors which had obviously been stressed by the Soviet 
representatives5o. 
, 
Despite this official refusal, the Soviet Embassy continued to lobby South 
Island centres in order to foster local momentum in favour of such access. On 14 
December 1984, the Soviet Ambassador made a 'courtesy call' on Christchurch 
mayor, Sir Hamish Hay, during which Aeroflot landing rights to Christchurch were 
discussed. Such initiatives then ran foul of the New Zealand Governments own 
difficulties with ANZUS. Following the decline of the request for a port visit by the 
USS Buchanan in January 1985, the Lange Government found it necessary to 
demonstrate that the Soviet Union would not benefit. On 22 February 1985, 
Ambassador Bykov was summoned by the Prime Minister and told to reduce Soviet 
diplomatic activity in New Zealand51 • 
Further Soviet requests along the same lines were made during the visit to 
Moscow by New Zealand Overseas Trade Minister Mike Moore. After discussions 
with acting Soviet Minister of Fisheries, Nikolai Kudryavtsev and the further 
extension of the 1978 Agreen1ent, the New Zealand Government once again rejected 
the request for Aeroflot landing rights on 27 September 198652. 
The prospects for the establishment of a New Zealand base for Soviet vessels 
operating outside New Zealand waters, and the attendant granting of landing rights for 
Aeroflot, appeared to be better in early 1989 than at any previous time. On 22 
September 1988, Prime Minister Lange announced that discussions were taking place 
with the Soviets concerning a servicing agreement. The agreement would, if signed, 
'layout certain basic ground rules' and 'it would then be over to any New Zealand 
company to enter into an agreement with Soviet trading enterprises'. These basic 
rules would concern 'bunkering, provedoring, maintenance and servicing of Soviet 
fisheries vessels from outside New Zealand's EEZ including major repairs and annual 
survey as well as ar~angements for the exchange of Soviet fisheries personnel by air'. 
The interesting justification for the 'more positive approach' by the New Zealand 
Government was described by Mr Lange as 'changed international circumstances'53. 
As has already been mentioned, the Government also decided to allow the Soviet 
Union to fish in areas other than Area E in the upcoming season (1988/89). The 
. 
change in international circumstances could have included not only the obvious: (i) 
encouraging signs in Afghanistan (the original cause for the restrictions); but also (ii) 
the perception that Soviet diplomatic activity in the South Pacific was now less 
provocative and most unlikely to succeed54; (iii) recognition that previous refusals by 
New Zealand to similar proposals had hardly discouraged Pacific island states from 
granting access to Soviet vessels; and (iv) possible foreknowledge that the Australian 
Government was considering a similar request from the USSR. 
Since this announcement, developments in the latest Soviet drive for access 
and landing rights have been dominated by local community interest in servicing the 
fleet and Deputy PM Palmer's visit to the Soviet Union in November 1988. On 8 
October of the same year, the Taranaki-based company, Technic Group Ltd, claimed 
that it had signed an agreement with Sovrybflot to represent the latter's interests in the 
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search for servicing facilities in New Zealand55. According to a series of media 
reports in October and November, the proposed facilities would involve and require; 
(i) the capacity to service 'at least 100' Soviet fishing vessels per year56, 
(ii) since each trawler would have a crew of approximately eighty, more than 300 
Soviet personnel would be flown in and out of the country each week57, to give a total 
of more than 16,000 Soviet fisheries personnel passing through the facility each 
year58. 
(iii) Aeroflot charter flights landing at one of the two New Zealand airports capable of 
taking the ilyushin 67 aircraft59 (eg Auckland airport in the case of a Port Taranaki ' 
facility60, Christchurch airport for a Lyttleton facility61). 
" 
(iv) the introduction of suitable dry dock or synchrolift facilities to handle the large 
vessels 62 into the chosen port(s). The main contenders at the end of 1988 included 
Lyttleton, Nelson and Pt Taranaki. Lyttleton's already existing dry dock is not 
capable of handling vessels the size of those planned to visit New Zealand63. 
(v) the possible use of 'skills from the Soviet Union's large Nahkhodka shipyards in 
the Far East'64. 
(vi) the provision of adequate sporting and recreational facilities for the Soviet crew 
members65. 
(vii) income for the servicing region of between NZ$43m and NZ$100m per annum66• 
The figure of NZ$2billion over twenty years67 has also been mentioned, giving some 
indication of the longevity of Soviet operations. 
(viii) direct employment of between 200 and 500 persons at the facility, with 500 to 
1500 New Zealanders being indirectlyengaged68. 
Given such optimistic forecasts regarding income and employment, it comes 
as no surprise that intense competition has arisen between local communities 
contending for the "contract". With Christchurch Members of Parliament lobbying for 
a Christchurch facility (ie, granting Aeroflot landing rights at Christchurch airport)69, 
the Soviets clearly have more allies for their proposal than was the case in 1984/5. 
Slava Vasiliev, the New Zealand Sovrybflot representative, has come out in favour of 
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the Port TaranakilNew Plymouth facilities, but has warned that the Soviet Union may 
choose Australia: 'We'll go where it is cheapest'7o. 
This shrewd use of inter-town competition may help the Soviets gain greater 
local concessions in a bid to attract the servIcIng base (eg local provIsIon of a 
substantial amount of the port infrastructure), but it is not at all certain that if an 
agreement is reached, the Soviet vessels would be serviced from just one New 
Zealand port7l . Nor, more importantly, is it clear whether the 1988 Soviet proposals to 
Australia and New Zealand are completely interchangeable72• 
Indeed, remarkably little information has surfaced as to precisely where the 
Soviet fishing vessels are to come from for servicing in New Zealand. Vasiliev has 
said that New Zealand has an advantage in bidding for the servicing contract because 
it is closer to South Pacific and Antarctic fishing grounds used by Soviet vessels73. 
'South Pacific' can. only mean South-eastern Pacific,ie off the west coast of South 
America. But Soviet vessels would need to be a long way from the American 
continent before steaming to New Zealand (let alone to Australia), became more 
efficient than heading for Peru, where servicing of Soviet vessels already occurs. 
Moreover, as has been shown above, Soviet fishing activity in Antarctic waters is 
, 
concentrated almost entirely in the Atlantic sector; again the voyage to New Zealand 
would be a long one! New Zealand's Deputy PM Palmer has stated that 'we are 
talking about the servicing of very large mother ships from a very substantial fleet 
involving ship repairs of a very radical character'74. But the difficulty of prediction is 
underlined by his further comment that 'they have got 3000 vessels alone in the 
Pacific fleet'75. (The 'Pacific fleet' would probably extend to Soviet fishing vessels 
operating to the north of Japan and these are most unlikely to be candidates for 
servicing in New Zealand). 
Before embarking on his seven day visit to the Soviet Union, Palmer gave a 
Radio New Zealand interview in which he stated that 'the facts are that the Soviets 
are very important trading partners for New Zealand and the economic prospects for 
this fisheries agreement is [sic] quite important for New Zealand and we need to 
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pursue it and investigate it'76. He may have been implying that the New Zealand 
Government envisaged greater economic benefits would come out of the current 
proposal than from the 1984/5 Nelson scheme. Palmer also accused Opposition 
Leader Jim Bolger of adopting 'mental thinking out of the 1950'S'77, following the 
latter's criticism of Government 'secrecy' in failing to disclose details of proposals 
regarding Aeroflot78 • Indeed, the Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's South Pacific 
Department had described as good the chances for New Zealand-USSR cooperation in 
fisheries and civil aviation79. Palmer however noted that this Soviet pronouncement 
had been the sole development since Lange's original statement on the issue in 
September 19888°. 
'. 
Palmer became the highest ranking New Zealand Minister to visit the Soviet 
Union in 28 years81 , and promised a significant warming of relations between the two 
countries. Indeed, ralmer expressed his hopes for increased high level exchanges 
between the USSR and New Zealand82, and issued an invitation for the Novosti press 
agency to set up its office again in Wellington83 . He also invited Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze and Deputy PM Kamentsev to visit New Zealand in 1989; Palmer had 
met with both men in the USSR as well as Fisheries Minister Kotlyar. 
, 
Palmer announced the New Zealand Government's rejection of the Soviet 
Union's proposal to link the servicing facilities with an increase in the quota assigned 
to Soviet vessels within the NZ EEZ84, and added at the end of his stay that the 
Soviets appeared to have accepted New Zealand's position on this matter85. While 
Palmer returned to New Zealand on 20 November, other members of the team 
(including John Matthews of Technic Group) stayed on for discussions regarding the 
specific Soviet requirements for the servicing facility86. 
At the time of writing, a considerable amount of discussion and background 
work on the proposal remained. The overall process consists of at least four stages: 
(i) the Soviets and interested New Zealand companies discuss in detail the specific 
requirements for the facility and examine what can be provided by New Zealand 
businesses, 
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(ii) with an understanding and approval of the economic benefits to be gained by New 
Zealand and the nature and quantity of work and investment to be provided by New 
Zealand business interests, the NZ Government negotiates with the USSR an 
"unlbrella" agreement paving the way for Soviet access. This is likely to be in the 
fonn of an amendment to the 1978 Agreement8?, 
(iii) separate negotiations between the NZ Government and Aeroflot to cover the air 
access requirement for crew changeover purposes88, 
(iv) the Soviets negotiate directly with New Zealand companies for the actual 
provisioning of servicing facilities. It is unlikely that this stage will be reached before 
mid-late 1989. 
". 
Indeed, the prospects for such a servicing facility in New Zealand have begun 
to look increasingly unlikely. The Soviet Ambassador Yuri Sokolov stated in March 
1989 that he was '~ot very optimistic' about the prospects for a New Zealand facility. 
The restructuring of the Soviet fishing industry, said Sokolov, .lneant that it was now 
up to Soviet fishing companies (ie Sovrybflot) rather than the Ministry of Fisheries to 
decide the sites for such facilities. This would mean that economic considerations 
would take priority and hence Australia was thus much more likely to be chosen to 
, 
service the fleet89. This comment seems to confmn suspicions that political objectives 
had been the driving force behind the series Soviet proposals to New Zealand. 
Securi ty concerns. 
Even if the commercial benefits to New Zealand show great promise and New 
Zealand companies are able to provide precisely the facilities required by the Soviets, 
the New Zealand Government would still have to face up to Aeroflot access. This is 
an essential precondition for the agreement as in 1984. Observing that Singapore 
services part of the Soviet fleet and that Singaporean leader Lee Quan Yew was 'not a 
communist' 90, Prime Minister Lange expressed his doubts about the Aeroflot 
requirenlent: 'I've always been a bit chary about that .... Soviet seamen can get off Air 
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New Zealand, off Singapore Airlines or whatever, as well as the next person '91. The 
Government's apprehension on this point is very understandable (see Ch.l) and is 
patent evidence that the strategic applications of the Soviet proposal have been kept in 
mind. 
Over seventeen years, published testimony as to these security concerns over 
already-existing Soviet fisheries activities in New Zealand waters appears to have 
been nunimal at best. It is clear that the New Zealand Government has not been 
completely naive on the matter. Yet, the establishment and extension of a Soviet 
presence which has the respectable image of commercial legitimacy, has been 
pursued rather successfully by the USSR. 
The Soviet Union's performance on the technical side of fisheries has often 
been superior to that of other nations. In the first twenty-two months of licensed 
Foreign Fishing Ve.ssel operations in the New Zealand EEZ, only two Soviet vessels 
were arrested for offences (both for using undersized mesh) compared with fourteen 
arrests of Korean vessels92. New Zealand observers on Soviet fishing vessels (under 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries's observer scheme) have been generally 
well treated by cooperative Soviet captains and crews93. However, the commercial 
realities are questionable. As Beaglehole writes; 'although it is not possible to 
determine the real costs faced by Soviet enterprises, one of the former joint-venture 
partners informed the writer that on their calculations they could not make economic 
sense of the Soviet fishing commitment to the New Zealand area'94. 
While it is known that the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the 
commercial, hard-nosed motives of other states to pursue strategic objectives, this 
would seem to be most applicable to the USSR's fishing relationships with the Pacific 
Island states. In the case of New Zealand, commercial motives on the part of the 
Soviets are at least plausible, and definitely make sense if consideration if given to 
trade in other commodities with New Zealand95. 
However, there are indications that the Soviet Union has sought to apply 
political pressure on the New Zealand Government via the numerous promises of 
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servicing contracts to local administrations. The appeals to Christchurch (see above) 
were not the only cause for concern in 1984. The Nelson facility offer also came hard 
on the heels of New Zealand's split with the United States over port access for 
American vessels. The intense Soviet efforts in New Zealand were intended (as an 
attempt) to widen that division. Using the sweetener of commercial advantages to 
local communities, the Soviets were making use of economic means to pursue rather 
more extensive ends. 
Even if the Soviet Union's 1988 proposal for servicing facilities have been 
made during a more settled period in New Zealand's foreign relations, there would be 
other causes for concern over such a development. First, the sheer number of Soviet 
" 
personnel entering New Zealand would create the need for a substantial increase in 
surveillance capabilities. This is particularly the case if one of the possibilities 
mentioned by Soviet representatives, namely the use of shipyard personnel from 
Nahodka, came to fruition. Given the experience of Singapore and the concerns over 
the Faroes facility expressed in the first chapter of this thesis, the potential security 
risk is obvious. Nahodka is a major centre for the KGB and serves as 'the principal 
home-port for ships of the Far East-based Maritime Border Guard' (also of the 
, 
KGB)96. 
Second, the lack of knowledge regarding the types of Soviet fishing vessels to 
be serviced at the proposed facility (their age, size, class, carrying capacity, ability to 
hide submersibles, port of origin and formation of approach to the New Zealand 
EEZ), means that direct military applications of such a fleet cannot be dismissed. 
However, the record of Soviet fishing vessels in New Zealand waters to date does 
seem to have been reassuring in this context. Indeed, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries observers who talked with the author were insistent that the Soviets showed 
no interest in collecting signals from Wellington. (If fingers are to' be pointed in this 
area, they should be in the direction of Japanese fishing vessels lying off Hokitika in 
the South Island). The radio equipment on the Soviet vessels which fish in New 
Zealand waters tends to be antiquated and secret SIGINT (signals intelligence) 
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collection rooms are noticeable for their absence. Interestingly though, observers are 
welcome to take photographs of any parts of the vessels except the radio equipment. 
In addition, the claim by Soviet captains that they are able to contact 
Vladivostok but not Wellington by telephone, seems difficult to believe. A 1984 
article noted that the Soviet Embassy in Wellington 'in the past has been its main 
listening post in the South Pacific. It played a significant role in monitoring the 
activities of the huge maritime effort, particularly in fishing, which the Soviet Union 
has mounted in the region and down to the Antarctic'97. A week does not go by on the 
regular Soviet fishing vessels in the New Zealand EEZ without the captain being in 
contact with Vladivostok by telephone which then connects him with Moscow via 
". 
radio. During the height of the season this contact is a nightly occurrence. The Fleet 
Commander of the fishing fleet is likely to be in even more regular contact with his 
superiors. Given tl).e strong GRU/Ministry of Fisheries ties (see Ch.l) there are 
obvious security implications here, especially in times of tension and war. One would 
hope that this speculation never has that wartime opportunity to be tested. 
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CHAPTER 3:KIRIBATI 
Regardless of the security implications of a licensed Soviet fishing vessel 
presence in the South Pacific Island region, the 1985 agreement between Kiribati and 
the Soviet Union was a watershed in the history of external power activities and 
efforts in the area. While · many commentators searched for immediate military 
benefits that would accrue to the USSR, the mere fact that the Soviets now had a line 
of communication and direct commercial relationship with a SPIS (South Pacific 
Island State) was sufficient to create consternation among the western security 
community. 
However, the USSR's success in gaining access for its fishing vessels to the 
Kiribati EEZ should not have come as much of a surprise to informed observers. First 
of all, the Soviet Up.ion had been making similar proposals to SPIS governments for 
several years (see Chapter 6) and it could not be assumed that every attractive Soviet 
offer would be met by a fIrm refusal until the end of time. Second, the actions of the 
citizens and government of the United States which should presumably have been the 
state most concerned to deny SPIS fishing access to the Soviet Union, had actually 
\ 
facilitated it. 
The latter was no more aptly demonstrated than in the case of the American 
Tunaboat Association vessel, the Jeanette Diana which was seized by the Solomon 
Island Government in June 1984. After the Solomon Islands High Court had found 
the owners and captain of the vessel gUilty of fishing illegally in Kiribati waters, the 
United States Government, bound by the Magnuson Act, reacted by imposing a ban 
on fish imports from the Solomons and agreed to pay compensation to the guilty 
parties l . In doing so, the damaging activities of the ATA, far from being checked as 
was necessary, were actually being encouraged. 
The SPISs were at that time also experiencing problen1s in their fisheries 
dealings with Korea, Taiwan and Japan. The offer of a large sum of money for access 
to Kiribati's Exclusive Economic Zone fron1 a nation which had not previously 
appeared to damage local interests, was bound to be attractive. This may be cause for 
surprise given the obvious ideological chasm between Marxist-Leninism and the 
prevailing Christianity of the South Pacific, but the weak nature of the Kiribati 
economy was highest in the minds of Tabai' s Government. With the local phosphate 
industry no longer in production, Kiribati was attempting to offset its dependence on 
foreign aid by developing commercial fisheries relationships with DWFNs. However, 
as the FFV operators tended to assume complete rights to the vital marine resources 
within Kiribati's huge EEZ, there was a strong feeling that Kiribati was not receiving 
its due under these agreements. 
With the failure of the negotiations between several South Pacific Island 
States and the American Tunaboat Association in late 19842, Kiribati lost an 
important source of fisheries income3• The Soviets who, according to Doulman, had 
been operating a tuna fleet of purse seine and long line vessels 'in the central and 
western Pacific since the 1970s'4, were therefore presented with an opportunity to 
augment their South Pacific presence. By late 1984 the USSR had made offers of 
fisheries agreements to a number of SPIS, including Kiribati and neighbouring 
Tuvalu5. The purse seiner Carol Linda then ran aground in Kiribati's territorial waters 
, 
while fishing illegally, thus further inflaming Kiribati-US relations6. Negotiations 
between Kiribati and the Soviet Union over a tuna fishing agreement began in Sydney 
the following month7• 
Before a second set of talks in Singapore in late May 1985, Kiribati President 
Ieremia Tabai stated that the possibility of shore access for Soviet vessels and the 
stationing of Soviet personnel on Kiribati territory had not been discussed8• Soviet 
access at such a level would undoubtedly cause alarm among concerned states in the 
region and Tabai was doing his best to balance economic self-interest with the 
concerns of others: 'We belong to the West', he said, 'but we are the only ones who 
know finally what is in our national interest'9. The Soviets for their part were plainly 
keen to push for shore access. Kiribati turned down a Soviet request during the 
Sydney round of talks for port access in order that Soviet vessels could be refuelled 
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and replenished, and apparently an additional request for the stationing of related 
personnel on Tarawa lO• The Soviet request for port facilities was made despite the 
obvious inability of Kiribati's infrastructure to cater for these vessels! 
A series of appeals from Australian and New Zealand diplomatics and 
leaders 11 , including at least three from Australia's Hawke to Kiribati's Tabai12 
followed. The United States Government expressed concern that Soviet fishing 
vessels in Kiribati's waters would be used to gather intelligence from the nearby 
Kwajalein atoll13• Nevertheless, Kiribati went on to sign a one year agreement with 
the Soviet Union in Manila on August 18 1985. Hence aln10st a full year before 
Gorbachev's watershed Vladivostok speech of July 1986, the Soviet Union had 
secured a fundamental upgrading of its presence in the South Pacific region. 
The agreement itself has not been released; the Kiribati Government has been 
parsimonious in its distribution for obvious reasons. However, from Doulman's 
analysis it appears that the document is similar to the standard South Pacific-DWFN 
fisheries agreements. Conditions of the Kiribati-USSR agreement include the 
following; 
(i) the ~ccess of up to 17 licensed purse seine and longline vessels to Kiribati's 200nm 
EEZ, 
(ii) a prohibition on these vessels entering Kiribati's 12nm territorial waters, although 
port access to Tarawa is allowed under an emergency, 
(iii) permission for Sovrybflot supply ships to replenish fishing vessels within the 
EEZ, 
(iv) the requirement that all licensed vessels be in good standing under the Forum 
Fishing Agency's Register of Forum Fishing Vessels14, 
(v) compliance by the Soviet vessels with the standardized provisions followed by the 
Nauru Agreement group of countries15 which, as represented by the practice of PNG, 
include the requirements that; 
(a) all licensed FFV leaving or entering the EEZ must notify by telex their intention to 
do so 24 hours in advance16, 
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(b) at time of entry to and once a week during operations in the EEZ, the FFV must 
report exact position and amount of fish on board, 
(c) all licensed FFV display international signal letters or radio call signals on the top 
of the vessel, 
(d) vessel numbers be painted on both bow and stern17; 
(vi) the acknowledgement of Kiribati's sovereign rights over resources in its EEZ and 
of Kiribati's own fishing legislation, 
(vii) the acceptance by the Soviet Union of full responsibility for the activities of its 
vessels within the 200nm zone, 
(viii) the payment, in three advance instalments ·of $US 1.5million by the USSR for 
the above access for one year from the signing of the agreement, 
(ix) the possibility of renegotiating, not extending, the agreement18• 
While Kiribati has been criticized for its decision to allow Soviet fisheries 
access, the agreement signed with the USSR was hardly irresponsible. The most 
careful and stringent clauses could of course not compensate for the very limited 
capability on the part of Kiribati to monitor any Foreign Fishing Vessel activity 
within its extensive waters. Kiribati could claim that the decision to allow Soviet 
vessels in its waters was justified on the grounds of national interest, but the island 
state was able to control neither the unwanted Soviet activiti~s that might follow from 
the agreement nor the 'encouragement that the arrangement would give to the USSR 
to seek similar access elsewhere in the region'19. 
Warnings from those other states that the Soviet Union was interested in more 
than tuna are at least partially supported by the extent of Soviet fishing in the Kiribati 
EEZ during the 1985-6 period. The Soviets, not known for their expertise in tropical 
fishing, used approximately eight fishing vessels (mainly seiners20 with associated 
supply vessels entering the EEZ) to catch about 2000 tonnes of fish21. According to a 
May 1985 report, most of the Soviet fishing activity was to occur around Tarawa, 
with less emphasis on the Phoenix and Line Island groups22. 
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In an effort to gain much needed currency, tuna caught in the Kiribati EEZ by 
the USSR was sold in offloading markets such as Singapore or at South American 
ports. Even at SUS 1000 per tonne23 , the sale of all the tuna caught minus operating 
and access fee costs could only have resulted in a net loss to the USSR over the 
twelve month period. As a very rough comparison, the Koreans paid Kiribati 
approximately A$600,000 to allow 110 tuna vessels to fish in the Kiribati EEZ for the 
year ended February 198924. 
For the Kiribati Government, the one year agreement was an undoubted 
commercial success. Tabai praised the Soviet fishing record on a number of 
occasions, saying that 'they have paid up as agreed', 'they have behaved as agreed'25 
and that the Soviets' record in submitting monthly reports of their catch had been 
scrupulous26. Soviet fishing in other parts of the world has not shared theses 
attributes, however7 and there were significant incentives in adhering to Kiribati's 
conditions: the better the adherence by the USSR, the starker the contrast with ATA, 
Japanese and Korean practice and the more attractive an agreement with the Soviets 
would appear to other SPISs. There were bigger fish in the offing than the tuna off 
Kiribati. 
Once prospects for a more extensive fishing relationship with Vanuatu began 
to look positive, (see Ch. 4), the USSR was in a position to demand a financially more 
acceptable renegotiation of the deal with Kiribati. Complaining about the size of the 
1985-6 catch off Kiribati27, the Soviet negotiators wanted to halve both the number of 
vessels licensed to operate in the EEZ and the amount paid for that access28. It is 
doubtful, however, that the USSR was especially serious about a further period of 
access to Kiribati waters, even under such relatively attractive conditions. Acceptance 
of the new proposal would undoubtedly have cost Tabai's Government both 
domestically (the 1985 agreement had polarised Kiribati popular opinions for 
'perhaps the first time'29) and regionally: "selling out" to Sovrybflot would not be 
well received. 
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With the Kiribati-USSR negotiations breaking down on September 1,19863°, 
President Tabai ordered Soviet fishing vessels out of the EEZ on October 1531 . This 
did not, however, spell the end to the Soviet Union's presence in Kiribati waters: in 
October 1988, for example, the research vessel Akademik Korolev visited several 
Kiribati islands in the circumstances of some controversy32, nor did it stop Tabai from 
making further approaches to the Soviets over renegotiation of the fishing 
agreement33. 
Given the apparent spread of perestroika to the bureaucratically stolid Soviet 
Ministry of Fisheries, the official Soviet line that "the fishing wasn't any good so we 
moved on", has some credence. Many, however, remain unconvinced as to why the 
Soviets should have pursued an agreement with Kiribati, whose marine resources are 
inferior to those of so many neighbouring states. 
Taking into .account the Soviet Union's tendency to use its fishing fleet as an 
auxiliary intelligence gatherer (see Ch.1) and the lack of vital data that could be 
harvested from Kiribati itself, attention has been focused squarely on the monitoring 
of K wajalein atoll in the Marshall Islands34, one thousand miles to the north of 
Kiribati. Long the splashdown point for United States ballistic missile tests out of 
' .. 
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, Kwajalein is the site for important radar, 
telemetric, and other systems used to track and monitor the missiles35. Radar tracking 
and other facilities are currently being upgraded at K wajalein to enable testing for 
Strategic Defence Initiative projects36, making the atoll an even more valuable target 
for Soviet SIGINT and ELINT missions. 
But if the major Soviet motive for seeking fisheries access in the region was to 
monitor Kwajalein, the subsequent shift southwards to fish in Vanuatu's EEZ does 
not make sense. While the granting of port access in the latter agreement (see Ch.4) 
would (in theory) permit the establishment of a permanent fishing vessel intelligence 
mission out of Pt Vila, the distances involved with respect to K wajalein appears 
prohibitive. Moreover, the USSR has more efficient (and cost-effective) ways of 
monitoring the atoll. Dedicated Soviet intelligence vessels frequently visit the waters 
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around Kwajalein itself; a November 1988 report stated that 'three times in recent 
weeks a Soviet surveillance ship has been detected inside territorial waters near the 
missile range'37. There has also been speculation that a Soviet submarine was 
deployed near Kwajalein and retrieved a Minuteman ICBM flight recorder which was 
test-fired from Vandenberg on July 7 198738• Fishing vessels operating one thousand 
miles or more further south are not in quite the same category ! 
On a related topic, it has been suggested by two American officials that the 
USSR may be planning to establish a base in the region from which to track its own 
satellite missions (K wajalein is also used by the US as a station for Pacific Barrier 
Radar, a chain which tracks Soviet satellites during their space gateway stage in fIrst 
orbit39). Both authors quote Rear Admiral Edward Baker's testimony to Congress in 
1986; 'the earth trace of Soviet manned space missions crosses in a path roughly 
parallel to the Gilbert and Line island chains; regional locations could be ideal for a 
ground tracking station, emergency landing sites or control facilities for a Soviet anti-
satellite programme'40. However, the Soviet Union did not establish ground facilities 
of any sort in Kiribati; evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviets viewed the 
agreement with Tabai's Government as a means to an end, ie that initial access would 
., 
lead to further opportunities in the region. It is unlikely that their aims included a 
space tracking facility in Vanuatu; Soviet reluctance to renegotiate a second fishing 
agreement on generous financial terms (see Ch.4) tends to argue against such a vital 
strategic objective, especially given the short time frames involved with the two 
agreements. 
Similarly, the Kiribati agreement may have been viewed by the USSR as the 
first step in gaining a South PacifIc base for the Soviet Navy41 (the "down from 
Vladivostok" thesis). But the following considerations bring this suggestion into 
question; (i) Kiribati did not allow port visits by Soviet fishing vessels, (ii) the 
relative unimportance of the South Pacific as a naval theatre: Soviet maritime activity 
in the area is characterized by merchant and "research" vessel operations for which 
port access in the region was already available, (iii) having once gained port access to 
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Vanuatu, the Soviet Union did not try seek to retain it by immediately renegotiating 
the agreement with Lini's Government (see ChA), (iv) the unlikelihood of any of the 
SPISs granting access to Soviet naval vessels in almost any circumstance. 
In the same manner, Gardner's suggestion that Soviet fishing vessels operating 
In Kiribati waters 'could also serve as floating supply depots for submarines'42 
presupposes Soviet submarine activity in the areas adjacent to Kiribati. In the absence 
of port access, such resupply could be provided just as easily from dedicated vessels 
out of Vladivostok. The low number of Soviet port visits to Vanuatu during the 
agreement in 1986-7 does not appear to support the supply depot idea either; a small 
SPIS is unlikely to be able to provide the resupply requirements of a large Soviet 
submarine. It is possible, though, that the fishing support vessels may have supplied 
units of the Soviet Navy en route to the Kiribati and Vanuatu fishing grounds, but 
such activity could pccur regardless of a fishing agreement. 
In general, then, the Soviet Union has many superior alternatives at its 
disposal to undertake these military objectives proposed for the fishing fleet around 
Kiribati. It is most likely that the achievement of a commercial relationship was but 
the firs~ stage. What then follows is the opportunity for increased leverage and the 
prospect of developing further opportunities for influence in the region. These would 
be reasons enough for the USSR to be pleased with the 1985 Kiribati-Soviet Union 
Agreement. 
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CHAPTER 4: VANUATU 
The Vanuatu Government's support for the Kiribati-Soviet Union Agreement 
expressed at the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga in August 19851, suggested that a 
Soviet-Vanuatu deal was well within the realms of possibility. For had not Father 
Walter Lini's Government been the maverick in the South Pacific community, 
especially in its relations with the Soviet Union and such states as Vietnam, Cuba and 
Libya? In 1982 Vanuatu had expressed its willingness to allow visits by Soviet naval 
vessels provided that they were neither nuclear powered nor nuclear armed2. While it 
is unlikely that the Soviets were clumsy enough to base their entire search for 
fisheries access in the region on this dubious promise, (which was not repeated, but 
de-emphasized by Vanuatu) it must not have served as a discouragement to the 
USSR. 
Nevertheless, at the time of the signing of the Kiribati agreement, it appeared 
to some commentators that Vanuatu was not rushing to secure a fishing relationship 
with the Soviet Union3• Desiring first to evaluate the progress of the Kiribati-USSR 
agreement, the Vanuatu Government established an interdepartmental committee later 
in 1985 to consider a similar proposal which had come from the Soviet Union in late 
19844. However, according to an April 1986 newspaper report, the Soviet Union and 
Vanuatu had .been conducting negotiations on the issue for seven months5. Hence 
informal talks at the very least had begun as early as September 1985. By April 1986, 
the committee (headed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Nikenike Vurobarau) was 
drafting a Memorandul11 of Understanding on the proposed agreement and was 
waiting on Soviet estimates of Vanuatu's tuna resources and of royalties to be paid for 
access6• Barak Sope, the Vanua'aku Pati's General Secretary, was quoted as saying 
\ 
that the proposed agreement was based on the Kiribati-USSR deal. Thus it was 
suggested that port access would not be allowed by Vanuatu7. 
After a week of Soviet-Vanuatu negotiations in Port Vila towards the end of 
June 1986, it was revealed that port access was definitely on the Soviet request list. 
As well as the usual EEZ access provision, the Soviets also included in their draft 
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agreement the servicing and refuelling of Soviet fishing vessels in Vanuatu ports and 
the use of Aeroflot charter flights for crew replacement purposes8. 
It is clear that the port infrastructure offered by Vanuatu, especially the deep 
port at Palikula (on Espiritu Santo) which had been constructed by Taiwan9, was 
much more attractive to the USSR than the paucity of facilities available at Kiribati. 
Vanuatu was apparently keen that the Soviets take over the fish freezing facilities at 
Palikula which the Japanese were about to vacate lO• 
In the midst of the negotiating process came two developments which could 
only have improved the chances of an outcome favourable to the USSR. On 1 July 
1986, Vanuatu and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations 11 . Then, in the 
middle of December 1986, the Soviet Union was the first of the nuclear powers to 
sign the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone12, (a move which could not 
have gone unnotic.ed by the intensely anti-nuclear Vanuatu). The timing of these 
developments was most fortuitous for the Soviets! 
After a week of Soviet-Vanuatu negotiations in Sydney which concluded on 
December 11, all issues bar the exact amount of royalties to be paid by the USSR, had 
been resolved13. The imminence of an agreement aroused warnings of Soviet 
interference in the South Pacific from Vincent Boulekone, leader of the opposition in 
Vanuatu14, and prompted Australia's Foreign Minister Hayden to issue a statement on 
the issue15. Lini rejected the warnings over Soviet activities contained in the latter, 
saying that 'the advantage is that. .... Vanuatu has a small population, making it easy to 
detect any mysterious activities, whereas in Australia and New Zealand it is not so 
easy and international espionage is on the increase'16. Hayden's reaction, said Lini, 
was 'Australian paranoia' 17. 
With the final round of negotiations taking place in January 1987, Vanuatu 
and the Soviet Union (represented by the Ambassador to Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu, 
Dr E.M.Samoteikin) signed the second agreement allowing Soviet fishing vessel 
access to an SPIS EEZ on January 2718. Similarities with the previous Kiribati accord 
include; 
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(i) the twelve month duration of the agreement, with additional access to be settled 
under a new agreement, rather than by extension of the original, 
(ii) access for Soviet fishing vessels to the 200nm EEZ, although in this case for a 
maximum of eight vessels only, 
(iii) a prohibition on fishing within Vanuatu's 12nm territorial waters, 
(iv) the payment of a comparable lump sum (US$1.5m) by the Soviet Union 19. 
The main distinction between the two agreements was the granting by 
Vanuatu of port access for the Soviet vessels, ostensibly for replenishment purposes20. 
The fishing vessels were to be allowed 'general access' according to Clarence Mare, 
Vanuatu's assistant Foreign Secretary21. Aeroflot was not given access under the 
agreement, causing the alarm voiced over Soviet intrusion (see below) to be 
tempered by at least one sigh of relief. 
Whatever t~e motives of the USSR might have been in signing, very little 
feeding of the Soviet population took place via their agreement with Vanuatu. Just 12 
tonnes of fish were caught by Soviet vessels in the twelve month period,22 confirming 
somewhat the impressions of many commentators that fishing was not the Soviet 
Union's foremost priority. In March 1987, the Managing Director of the South 
Pacific Fishing Corporation, Eisei Ishikawa had noted that the fee of US$1.5million 
did not accord with the poor and highly seasonal (December-March) tuna fisheries in 
Vanuatuan wilters23. Admiral Lyons, Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, 
supported this line of thought, saying that the high fee made the tuna caught by the 
USSR around Vanuatu the most expensive fish in the world24. 
If the deal was a purely commercial one for the Soviet Union, one would 
expect that the maximum number of vessels allowed would have been employed to 
justify the fees paid. However, as had been the Soviet practice in the waters of 
Kiribati, less than half of the vessels allowed to fish in Vanuatu's EEZ were doing so 
at anyone time. But twelve tonnes spread over just two or three vessels does not full 
time fishing make, and the Soviet fishing vessels spent considerable time in the 
Vanuatu EEZ not engaged in fishing. An Orion surveillance flight on March 30,1987, 
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located five Soviet purse seiners about ten miles outside the boundary of the Solomon 
Islands' EEZ25, indicating that more vessels were available for full time fishing in the 
waters of Vanuatu if more serious fishing was the goal (and that non-Vanuatu EEZ 
fisheries were more productive). 
Lacking tuna fishing expertise and appropriate equipment, the first visit to port 
by a Soviet fishing vessel was an exercise in public relations as nluch as anything 
else. The 30m "Tamga", which visited Port Vila in April 1987, had a crew of 32 and 
the capacity to carry 700 tonnes of fish26. The Director of Vanuatu's Fisheries 
Department, Richard Kaltonga said that the "Tamga", which obtained food and fuel 
supplies while in port27, was not a 'spy' ship and was similar to other FFVs being 
used in Vanuatu's waters28• The Vanuatu Fisheries Departn1ent said that five other 
Soviet fishing vessels were operating within the Vanuatu EEZ at the time29. 
Following one of the most unproductive twelve months spent by any Distant 
Water Fishing Nation in another nation's EEZ, Samoteikin indicated the Soviet 
Union's willingness to renegotiate because of good catches made by Soviet vessels 
around Vanuatu in 1987! As if to underline the absurdity of his own argument, the 
Soviet Ambassador said that the earlier agreement with Kiribati had not proven 
. , 
economically viable3o• However, when it came to the "renegotiations" themselves, 
Soviet officials were quick to point out that they were unhappy with the catch levels 
obtained in 1987. 
Indeed, prospects for successful renegotiation did not look promising after a 
visiting Soviet trade mission had complained about poor catches and told the Vanuatu 
Government that the USSR was now interested only in multilateral fishing 
agreements because tuna, as migratory species, did not confine themselves to single 
EEZS31. Nevertheless, the first round of new Vanuatu-USSR talks was held in 
Singapore, but broke down at the end of August 1988 after disagreement arose over 
the amount payable by the Soviets for a further twelve month period of access to the 
EEZ. Vanuatu apparently demanded as much as, if not more than, the US$1.5m paid 
in 198732• 
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Prime Minister Lini remained confident, saying that 'it looks as if the Soviet 
Union is determined to be in the region'33. However, his qualification of that 
statement must have been regarded with concern in some quarters: 'I don't think they 
would be satisfied with just fishing agreements, they want some facilities, missions'34. 
A further round of talks in Sydney produced little in the way of progress; Vanuatu 
was still insistent upon a large lump sum, whereas the Soviet Union was keen on a 
smaller initial payment followed by a per tonne rate to be paid on fish caught under 
the agreement. 
While the chances of a Soviet fishing agreement with one of the small SPISs 
look less promising in early 1989 than they have in earlier years, the approach from 
" 
previously critical quarters has moderated considerably. During the early months of 
the Vanuatu-USSR agreement, Australia's Prime Minister had stated that he found 'it 
difficult on the bas,is of Soviet activities around the world over the last couple of 
decades to accept that they would limit their interests to purely fishing'35. But, 
towards the end of that same year, Bill McKinnon, Australia's High Commissioner in 
New Zealand, was saying that Soviet efforts to obtain fishing agreements with SPISs 
were going slowly36, and Foreign Minister Hayden commented in August 1987 that 
, 
Soviet fishing activities to date in the South Pacific had been conducted in a proper 
fashion37. 
A recent statement by Hayden's successor, Gareth Evans, has confirmed this 
trend in Australia's outlook. Soviet conduct in its fishing agreements with Kiribati 
and Vanuatu indicated nothing more than 'a normal commercial relationship'. 
Moreover, said Evans, 'the question of the Soviet presence in the South Pacific is less 
cause for alarm generally these days'38. Clearly, the Australian Government's 
statements of warning in the past have not prevented the SPISs from considering and 
signing agreements with the USSR, and if continued, would run the risk of charges of 
hypocrisy given Australia's own negotiations with the Soviet Union over fishing 
vessel access (see Ch.S). 
Criticism of the Vanuatu-Soviet Union Agreement has not disappeared 
altogether, though. While former President George Sokomanu was correct in saying 
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that his country had not become a communist state after the Soviets had paid their 
access fees39 , questions remain over more subtle security implications stemming from 
the Soviet fishing presence. 
While the greater interest shown by the USSR in renegotiating with Vanuatu 
than with Kiribati indicates that immediate fishing success is not the major 
determinant behind the proposals, it does point to the importance of port access. But if 
the Soviet Union did wish to base extensive South Pacific operations from Port Vila, 
be they fisheries, naval, space or otherwise, then the US$1.5m requested by Vanuatu 
(and rejected by the USSR) for renewal of such access would not seem to be an 
excessive investment. It is more likely that the "non-threatening" Soviet use of its 
access to Vanuatu's ports during the agreement has increased the chances that other 
SPIS will agree to similar conditions in the future. 
Another major cause for suspicion surrounds the Soviet request for access to 
Vanuatu by air. Unless the Soviets were planning to use Vanuatu as the centre for 
comprehensive South Pacific Island fishing operations, (a scenario not borne out by 
subsequent developments), the proposal for Aeroflot access was not consistent with 
the small number of vessels envisaged under the agreement. However, clumsy 
bureaucracy may have played a part here; EEZ, port and Aeroflot access appear to be 
the standard troika adopted by Sovrybflot in its proposals to any potential fishing 
agreement partner. In addition, Vanuatu's favourable comments during the early 
stages of negotiation regarding the conditions of access may have encouraged such a 
forward Soviet negotiating position. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union's persistent 
attempts to establish personnel on the ground in both Kiribati and Vanuatu (be it in 
the way of Aeroflot or fishing representatives and personnel), cannot be ignored. The 
possibility of Soviet hopes for influence in these countries of a very direct nature is 
not without precedent (See Ch.l). 
The case for Soviet intelligence gathering and other military activities via 
fishing vessels operating under the agreement with Vanuatu, is not particularly 
convincing. Vanuatu is even further away from Kwajalein than is Kiribati and, 
because of this distance, vessels would need to spend most of their time outside the 
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Vanuatu EEZ if Kwajalein was to be a monitoring target. The collection of electronic 
intelligence from within the Vanuatu EEZ and even from inside its ports would 
appear to be a most unrewarding (and expensive) task: there is hardly a wealth of 
communications radiating from Port Vila! 
But there are other possibilities to consider. Some American commentators 
have suggested that the Soviet fishing vessels would be used to map the ocean floor to 
enable future Soviet submarine operations in the area40• However, there would appear 
to be little basis for especial Soviet submarine interest in Vanuatuan waters. More 
capable "research vessels" could accomplish such a task throughout the region 
without the necessity of payment to and approval from South Pacific Island States. 
\, 
As early as 1981, Soviet offers to undertake seabed research for Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands were followed quickly by Australian counter-offers to map seabeds 
in the region41 . 
Recently, the Soviet Union has again pushed for membership of the 
Committee for the Coordination of Offshore Prospecting in the South Pacific 
(CCOP/SOPAC), and has proposed dives by manned submersibles around New 
Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and PNG42. While New Zealand was apparently prepared to 
. 
allow dives off the North Island43, Fiji's refusal to consider the proposal44 has led to 
the withdrawal of the Soviet offer for 1989. Given that trouble has already been 
experienced with Soviet deep sea cruises in the South Pacific (the Soviets have not 
provided complete data from the voyages), further cooperation from regional states 
should proceed cautiously, if at all. 
It has also been claimed that Soviet submarines would be supplied by the 
fishing vessels visiting Vanuatu's ports under the agreement45. This presupposes 
significant levels of Soviet submarine activity in the South Pacific; an assumption not 
borne out by the available evidence. Incidents involving such activity have tended to 
be shrouded in conjecture, rather than corroborated by firm evidence. The Kwajalein 
"nose cone" episode is based on no more than circumstantial evidence46, and although 
a submarine located off the Cook Islands by an RNZAF Orion in February 1986 was 
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believed to be a Soviet naval vessel, the New Zealand Prime Minister attempted to 
cloud the issue with his statement that it might have been a 'whale with flatulence'47. 
Interestingly, though, the latter sighting was followed on 11 March 1987 by 
the sighting of the Chumikan, a Soviet missile-range instrumentation vessel, 192krn 
north-east of Aitutaki(Cook 1slands)48. The Soviet Union's satellite-related interest in 
the South Pacific cannot be described as minimal, but it is difficult to see an 
immediate application in this area arising from the Vanuatu-USSR fishing agreement. 
The most that can be said is that the Soviet-SP1S dialogue arising from the two fishing 
agreements to date may enable the Soviets to spread the veneer of legitimacy over 
future proposals. 
As expected, the Soviets have not take kindly to suggestions that they sought 
and signed the agreement with Vanuatu for non-comn1ercial reasons. Ambassador 
Samoteikin was very firm on this issue: 'We have said we have no intention of 
establishing military bases here; no military agreements, no secret installations, no 
subversion, nothing. We need fish. We have 280 million people to feed ... .In our deal 
with Kiribati we strictly followed the tenns'49. Indeed, Dr Samoteikin's superiors 
have d<;>ne their best to ridicule suggestions of security implications involved with 
Soviet fishing; in giving his guarantee that Soviet fishing vessels would not be used 
for intelligence if allowed access to Australian ports, (see Ch. 5), Kamentsev said, 'I 
want to assure you that no one fishing boat is equipped with any nuclear bomb or 
some superman spies'5o. After his 1987 visit to Australia, Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze ridiculed the critics; 'Beware, they say, Soviet fishermen In your 
waters may be followed by Soviet submersibles camouflaged as fishing boats'51. Such 
sarcastic responses to serious concerns do little to dismiss suspicions that the Soviets 
are interested in more than access to marine resources. 
The real answer probably lies with less obvious reasoning. Having gained port 
access and been careful not to make waves regionally by undertaking blatant non-
fisheries activities, the USSR has improved its image in the South Pacific, and may 
hope that larger states in the area will be less reluctant to allow access for a variety of 
vessels in the future. For if Australia and Papua New Guinea can be encouraged to 
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believe that the Soviet Union has a legitimate and largely peaceful role to play in the 
South Pacific, then Soviet contacts with (and influence over) the smaller states can be 
increased via these larger regional powers. 
", 
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CHAPTER 5: AUSTRALIA 
Australia has not been a particularly happy hunting ground for Soviet fisheries 
negotiators. Since the mid-late 1970s the Soviet Union has made a series of proposals 
to Australian Governments to permit access for Soviet fishing vessels in Australian 
waters. Overall, Canberra has been unenthusiastic. The main exception to this pattern, 
when such access was being seriously considered by the Fraser Government in 1979, 
fell victim to the invasion of Afghanistan. 
This reluctance to approve Soviet fisheries proposals has been based largely 
upon justified concern over the two main threats posed by the Soviet fishing fleet to 
Australian interests. Not only do Soviet fishing vessels cany with them potential 
threats to military security, but Australia's overfished waters would not benefit from 
the presence of Soyiet trawlers which have tended to be the "vacuum cleaners" of 
fishing. 
Australia's early experiences with the Soviet "fishing fleet" were not 
encouraging on either count. In February 1969, the "trawler" Van Gogh was not 
welcomed by domestic fishing operators off the north of the continent because it was 
initially thought to be 'a fast, long-range trawler poaching on Australia's rich prawn 
beds'!. Subsequent assessments revealed that the nature of the threat was rather 
different: the Van Gogh and the Prometej, another Soviet vessel in the area, were later 
viewed by 'Australian intelligence authorities' as 'Pueblo-type, electronic spy ships 
checking signals from and collecting data on vital defence bases in northern 
Australia'2. 
These dual concerns have meant that the Soviets have not been and are 
unlikely to be granted access to the fishing stocks within the 200 nautical mile 
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) on a commercial basis. In response to this, the Soviet 
Union has made a number of proposals which seek to bypass this restriction; eg for 
research fishing and access for Soviet fishing vessels which operate outside the AFZ. 
What follows, then, is an analysis of Soviet efforts in this regard and of Australia's 
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responses to such requests over the past decade. The Soviet proposal before the 
Australian Government in the middle of 1989, which relates to the servicing of Soviet 
vessels in Australian ports, will be examined in detail. 
Soviet efforts 1978-1984. 
On 10 April 1978, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Anthony, met with 
Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Smelyakov in Canberra and provided details on 
Australia's new resource policy under the AFZ3. It is clear that the Soviets were 
interested in framing a proposal acceptable under these new circumstances. As with 
the establishment of New Zealand's EEZ, the Australian Fishing Zone opened the way 
for the official recognition of a Soviet fisheries presence. Only a month earlier, the 
Federal Governme~t had been approached by a Victorian company specialising in 
Australian-USSR trade, (Commercial Bureau Australia, Pty Ltd) to grant fishing 
rights for an estimated A$100m a year industry. Among the list of proposed 
participants was V /0 Sovrybflot. During the early stages of the operation, use was to 
be made of Soviet fishing crews and of the Soviet market for the harvesting and the 
• 
sale of the catch respectively4. 
Soviet offers proliferated over the ensuing months and by September 1979, 
two fishing fe'asibility studies proposed by the USSR were 'under active consideration 
by the Commonwealth and the relevant states's. In December of that year, the 
Australian Government agreed in principle to allow Soviet fishing trials, limited to 
10,000 tonnes of fish, until June 19806• This was to involve three Black Sea based 
Soviet trawlers and one mother ship conducting the trials south of Australia, and 
access for these vessels to Australian ports for refuelling and repair7. This constituted 
the first stage of a two-stage proposal; the latter showing marked similarity to Soviet 
proposals regarding Nelson in 1984 and Australia and New Zealand in 1988/9. 
Under the second stage, the Australian-Soviet consortium, consisting of Henry 
Jones (IXL) Ltd, Commercial Bureau Australia and V/O Sovrybflot8, would apply to 
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the Federal Government to grant access for Soviet fisheries vessels, crew and aircraft. 
If such approval was granted, a new floating dock from the Black Sea was to be 
purchased by the consortium (for approximately A$10m9) and towed to Hobart. That 
city would then become 'the main port for the Soviet Antarctic fleet'lO. An estimate 
given in 1988, refers to at least 80 Soviet vessels using the facility each yearll . 
The extent of Soviet access to Hobart would have been considerable under the 
proposal. Not only would the task of repairing and revictualling Soviet fishing vessels 
be carried out there. Accomodation would be required in the form of a compound for 
at least 100 Soviet fishing personnel. The granting of landing rights to Aeroflot for 
regular charter flights to the Tasmanian capital12 was also proposed. The potential 
surveillance task for Australia would have been extensive. 
An estimate of the size of the Soviet Antarctic fishing fleet at 200 vessels13 
may have been the ~ause for financial optimisn1 on the part of the regions which had 
hoped to service the vessels (either the West Australian seabord or Tasmania). But 
suggestions that the Soviet fleet was to be concentrated around Macquarie Island14 are 
difficult to reconcile with the low level of Soviet fisheries activity in the Pacific sector 
of Antarctic waters (see Ch.l). As will be seen later in this chapter, Soviet fisheries 
proposals have continued along these lines. Soviet representatives have made 
promises of commercial benefits to apply pressure on the Federal Government via 
interested state administrations and private business interests, but have remained 
vague about the viability of the actual fishing operations envisaed. (As Chapter Two 
has shown, the same also applies to the Soviet proposals to New Zealand). 
The refusal of the Fraser Government on 9 January 1980 'to meet or consider 
Soviet requests' regarding direct USSR-Australian Aeroflot flights and the entry of 
Aeroflot officers into Australia15 did not augur well for a long term Soviet fisheries 
presence in Australia. Stage 2 of the proposal was unlikely to proceed without this 
essential precondition. However, it was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan 
which dealt the fatal blow to any chances of a 1980 fisheries access agreement. 
The similarity between and coordination of the New Zealand and Australian 
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responses to Afghanistan is obvious here. The January 1980 suspension of the 
proposed visit to Australia by a Soviet fisheries delegation, of research vessel visits to 
Australian ports and, most significantly, of the consideration of the joint venture 
agreements with Tasmania and West Australia16, destroyed the possibility of Soviet 
I 
access in the short term just as local momentum was building up in support of the 
Soviet requests. Tasmanian Premier Lowe, who had earlier described the Hobart-
based sevicing facility as the 'most significant economic development in Tasmania for 
many years'17, attacked the Afghanistan-inspired ban and claimed that it had cost 
Tasmania one thousand jobS18• 
Australia and New Zealand were also equally anxious to avoid self-imposed 
economic sacrifice. Suspension of the Soviet proposals affected promised, rather than 
actual, earnings. The Australian Government did cancel the upcoming Soviet cruise-
ship season. (The ~979 season had seen twenty cruises to Australia by four Soviet 
shipS19). But the Soviet Union's Far Eastern Shipping Company's (FESCO) Pacific 
North West Service from Japan and the Baltic Australia Line between the European 
USSR, Europe and Australia were not affected20• Hence Australia's very favourable 
terms of trade with the USSR were permitted to continue. 
The post-Afghanistan refusal to allow port calls by Soviet cruise and fishing 
vessels may have reduced potential threats to security in the Australian region, but the 
Australian Go'vernment could not deny the Soviets freedom of passage in and around 
Australian waters. The presence of dedicated Soviet intelligence collection vessels 
continued in the early 1980s. As per usual, Soviet 'intelligence trawlers' sat off the 
Australian coast during the 1981 (ANZUS) Kangaroo exercises staged near 
Rockhampton in Queensland21 • In 1982, the Soviets sent seven vessels to recover a 
'space capsule' 300nm south of Cocos Island. Included in the flotilla were the naval 
missile-range-instrumentation vessel, Chumikan, a Krivak class guided missile frigate, 
the space support ship Kosmonaut Georgi Dobrovolsky and one AG122• (The 
Chumikan and K.G.Dobrovolsky also feature in Ch.2). Later that year, the Australian 
Government issued a formal complaint to the Soviet Union over the activities of a 
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Soviet research vessel, also off Cocos Island. The Antares carried out repairs in late 
August 1982, before it had sought the necessary perrmsslon from Cocos Island 
authorities to anchor and land crew on the Australian territory23. 
The years 1981-1984 were relatively quiet ones for the USSR-Australian 
fisheries relationship. Although Prime Minister Hawke announced the lifting of the 
"Afghanistan bans" on March 18,198324, prospects for an agreement during the early 
months of the new Labor Government could not have been enhanced by the expulsion 
from Australia of Soviet First Secretary, Valery Ivanov in April 198325 , and the 
downing of Flight KAL007 in September of the same year. An Australian trade 
delegation led by Trade Secretary Scully did, however, visit Moscow in October 1983 
for a meeting of the Mixed Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation. The 
Soviets were obviously keen on restoring fisheries to the agenda and made a new 
request for Soviet r~search vessel access to the AFZ26. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union had renewed its efforts to gain support from 
Australian state governments, with offers being made to at least three states. However, 
the proposals to Tasmania and New South Wales became casualties of the Ivanov 
affair and the West Australian Cabinet rejected the Soviet proposal on security 
'" 
grounds. The latter was due mainly to the proximity of the proposed servIcIng 
facilities to HMAS Stirling, a regular port of call for both Australian and American 
naval vessels. This proposal was another Elders IXL-Sovrybflot effort27 and was put 
to the West Australian Government in mid-1984. Options included the offer of low 
interest loans to the West Australian Government for the construction of dry dock 
facilities or the installation of a Soviet-built dry dock28. The flexibility shown by the 
Soviets at this time is quite exceptional; they appeared to be unconcerned as to which 
centre became the HQ for their Antarctic operations; be it Hobart, Perth or Sydney! 
Prospects Improve: 1987-1989. 
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But the Australian Federal Government was obviously willing to consider 
Soviet fisheries access just one step at a time. As in 1979, the first such step was the 
agreement in principle in March 1987 to allow Soviet research fishing near Heard and 
McDonald Islands in Australia's Antarctic territory. However, the viability of the 
fisheries resources in the area was as doubtful as it had ever been29, and it is possible 
that the Soviets viewed this initial access as a useful foot in the door Gust as they 
viewed Kiribati as a step to Vanuatu). 
Overall, though, 1987 was a year of warming Soviet-Australian relations. 
Against the background of "changed international circumstances" (see Ch.2), the visit 
by a Soviet delegation to Australia in October 1987 signalled a more intensive trading 
relationship between the two countries30. The trip by PM Hawke and Foreign Minister 
Hayden to the Soviet Union later that month not only confirmed this trend, but gave 
the Soviet authoriti.es the opportunity to press claims for a comprehensive fishing 
agreement to the most senior levels of the Australian Government31• Since that time, 
bilateral fishing negotiations and the proposals involved have been the focus of 
considerable attention and debate. 
In the last week of April 1988, a delegation led by Soviet Deputy Minister 
Kudryavtsev visited Canberra and presented the latest version of the proposed 
fisheries package. As reported in 'Australian Fisheries', the proposals included; 
(i) a 'Government to Government agreement on fisheries co-operation' , 
(ii) 'access to a port for USSR fishing vessels operating in southern waters for 
purposes of repair, revictualling and crew changes', 
(iii) 'access to an Australian airport for Aeroflot charter flights for crew changeover 
purposes only', 
(iv) commercial research in the AFZ, utilising USSR trawlers operating off the north 
western, western and south western coasts'32. The original request involved two such 
vessels33 , with Australian observers onboard if required34 • 
(v) 'commercial arrangements for landing Soviet caught fish to Australian processors', 
(vi) 'continuation of scientific research in the AFZ adjacent to Heard and McDonald 
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Islands '35. 
Estimates of the number of Soviet fisheries personnel annually involved in the 
proposal have ranged from 450036 to 900037, with the latter figure likely to be more 
accurate. For although the figure of fifty Soviet vessels making use of the 
servicing/crew changeover facilities has been quoted repeatedly38, under Soviet law 
the crews on fishing vessels must be changed every six months39. Hence each vessel 
would make at least two visits to an Australian port per year. With estimates of the 
average crew size per vessel ranging from 6040 to 8041 , between 12000 and 16000 
Soviet fisheries personnel would pass through Australia each year. 
Whatever the true figure, the demands on the Australian security community 
would be substantial. As Hayden noted in 1987, the Australian Government already 
devotes 'a great number of highly skilled (personnel) and some very expensive 
resources' to make sure that the activities of Soviet personnel in Australia are 
'properly monitored' and that their movements are 'circumscribed' 42. This effort will 
not only be complicated by the presence of such a large number of fisheries personnel, 
but also by Soviet citizens involved in the 25 Aeroflot flights which would take place 
each year between the USSR and Australia43. The accusation made by Victorian 
-, 
Federal MP, Ken Aldred, that the manager of Aeroflot's Sydney ticket office, Mr 
Vladimir Podshipov, was suspected of being a GRU major44, has not served to reduce 
apprehensions over the issue of Aeroflot access. 
According to the Australian representative of the USSR Register of Shipping, 
Ian Cox, the rationale behind the Soviet Union's request for a servicing facility and 
fishing vessel and air access, is purely an economic one. Not only are Soviet southern 
ocean fishing operations moving to the areas around Heard and McDonald Islands, but 
having vessels based from an Australian port would involve substantial savings over 
the current practice of using Singapore45. Yet neither argun1ent is particularly 
conVInCIng. Heard and McDonald Islands do not sit astride the major Antarctic 
fisheries resources and' Singapore ren1ains the cheapest major ship-repair center in the 
world'46. While the Soviet Union may save a certain amount in the long term if they 
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were to use Australia instead of Singapore (via reduced steaming times and distances), 
it is not at all certain that the figure of A$50m per annum (at a net saving of $lm per 
year for each of the 50 Soviet vessels47) is entirely accurate. The establisment of such 
an operation will incur significant costs for the USSR even if these are shared with 
Australian industries, especially if the costs of building, moving and installing a dry 
dock are included. 
The other side of the financial equation - the input to the local economy - may 
appear attractive to state administrations. Alongside total Australian trade with the 
Soviet Union, it would not make a massive contribution to the Australian economy. At 
the quoted fee of A$200,OOO per port ca1l48, up to A$20m per annum would be 
generated for the Government. However, the latter would need to spend a substantial 
portion of that income on additional surveillance precautions. Hence it would be in the 
wider economic rel.ationship with the Soviet Union by way of increasing Australian 
access to Soviet markets, that any undeniable economic benefit will arise for 
Australia. Promises relating to employment creation in the region servicing the fleet 
are just that (promises) and cannot be tested until well after any agreement is signed. 
That very signing will not occur before an extensive set of bilateral 
, ..... 
negotiations have taken place. After details of the Soviet proposals were made public 
in May 198849, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade took a draft submission 
fronl his Department to Cabinet which, on June 16, decided in principle to continue 
fisheries negotiations with the Soviets5o• The submission had apparently suggested 
that further such negotiations were required before an accurate analysis of the 
commercial and security implications was possible51 . 
The visit to Australia of Vladimir Kamentsev early the following month was 
not only the occasion for some timely propaganda from the Soviet Deputy Prime 
Minister, but also gave the Australian Government an opportunity to press for a more 
comprehensive economic relationship between the two countries. In meetings with no 
less than four Australian Departments52, Kamentsev was told that the Australian 
acceptance and signing of the proposed fishing agreement was dependent upon 
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improved access for Australian commodities to the Soviet market53. Kamentsev later 
agreed that 'we have to show we can be beneficial to both sides'54. 
The bilateral negotiations process has not only been extended by these 
Australian conditions, but also by Soviet inconsistency over its requests for fishing 
access. In early November, the Minister for Trade Negotiations informed a Federal 
ALP caucus meeting that the Soviet Union had proposed during the Moscow-based 
first round of Australian-Soviet negotiations in September 1988, that between six and 
eight feasibility fishing vessels be allowed to fish in the AFZ. This was a significant 
increase on the original proposal for two such vessels55. This new suggestion brings 
into question Soviet intentions and seriousness in the whole process as it precipitated 
the very predictable Australian response that this level of "research" fishing would 
endanger already over-exploited fisheries56. The need for such a substantial presence 
in the AFZ is diffic.ult to explain, although the Soviets may have seen it as a way to 
press their case for full-scale commercial fishing access to the AFZ (ie similar to their 
arrangement with New Zealand). As a result of this new request, fisheries negotiations 
were in a state of 'suspended animation'57 in late 1988/early 1989, until the 
resumption of talks on the issue was announced in February58 . 
. " 
This second round of negotiations took place in Canberra from February 27 
(1989). With the apparent concurrence of the Soviets to drop the 6-8 vessel claim, the 
draft texts of two agreements covering fisheries and commodities were drawn up. At 
the time of writing, these drafts were under consideration by both the Soviet and the 
Australian Federal Governments59• It is clear that the latter will not sign the fisheries 
agreement unless progress on the access to the Soviet Union for Australian 
commodities is forthcoming. On the fisheries front, the first year of Soviet access is 
likely to be restricted to the two feasibility fishing vessels which, according to one 
report, 'will carry three biologists and a surveyor from Australia and will share 
information gained'60. Access for the servicing, supply and crew replacement of the 
non-AFZ Soviet vessels is thus unlikely to occur before 1991, although it is obvious 
that the USSR would like to obtain this sooner rather than later. Vladimir Ikrianov, the 
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Soviet Fisheries Ministry's 'deputy chief of external relations' has invited Australian 
journalists to board Soviet fishing vessels and check for 'spying equipment'61. 
The debate over security implications, 
While negotiating fishing access as part of an overall package will improve the 
net financial gain for Australia, it may tend to push security concerns to the 
background as the attractiveness of those commercial benefits becomes more 
prominent. In the event of a fishing agreement allowing access to Australian ports and 
airports it would be interesting to learn of the relative importance placed by the 
Australian Government on (a) reports by the intelligence and security community 
doubting the legitimacy of Soviet fishing activities, and (b) the improving levels of 
Australian-Soviet trade. 
Although it has been reported that the 'strategic element' of Soviet fishing 
access to Australia has already been settled within the Australian Federal 
Government62, it is most unlikely that the last has been heard of public debate on the 
security questions. Despite the Fraser Government's receptive attitude towards similar 
Soviet offers a decade ago, the Federal Opposition has been quick to point out 
possible dangers involved in access for the Soviet fishing fleet. The Leader of the 
Opposition, John Howard, has gone so far as to say that 'this proposal completely 
undermines the basis of strategic denia1'63. 
By far the most comprehensive Parliamentary critique has come from Ken 
Aldred, Member of Parliament for Bruce. In a May 1988 House of Representatives 
debate, Aldred warned of the intelligence and wartime activities of both the Soviet 
fishing fleet and Aeroflot64. While his claim that the Soviets could use Okean Class 
AGls in its research fishing in the AFZ is open to doubt (and would not go unnoticed 
by the Australian Defence forces), his statement rates as one of the more pertinent 
contributions to Hansard in 1988. 
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Additional criticism has been made by two former ASIO Directors General, 
Alan Wrigley65 and Harvey Barnett, with the latter concerned over the possibility of 
the Soviet Union using 'a fishing fleet based say in Hobart or another Australian 
port. ... to service an on-going intelligence operation in Australia'66. 
Michael O'Connor has launched attacks on the debate itself; saying that the 
Australian-centric focus has ignored the key issue, namely the use of the Soviet 
vessels 'to discover through oceanographic research suitable operating conditions and 
havens for Soviet submarines in Australia's southern and western approaches'67. This, 
however, would appear to apply mainly to the Soviet research fishing vessels 
operating within the Australian fishing Zone under the first stage of the agreement. 
The Australian Government has refused to allow access for more than two such 
vessels (see above). O'Connor's argument does not explain the main thrust of the 
Soviet effort; to g~n a servicing facility and access for vessels which will spend the 
bulk of their time operating in fishing grounds outside Australia's 200 mile zone. 
Moreover, O'Connor does not explain the strategic significance of Soviet submarine 
operations in these waters. 
Despite these claims, it is likely that the major security concern involved with 
',. 
the proposed agreement will continue to be the introduction of Aeroflot access to 
Australia. However, the Soviet airline n1ay gain an Australian presence irrespective of 
the results of fisheries negotiations. Ansett already has an agreement with Aeroflot 
Cargo Express, a joint Soviet-Australian concern, under which freight from Australia 
will connect with overseas Aeroflot flights68. The Soviet Union is also aiming to 
establish direct charter flights between Australia and the USSR during the months of 
July, August and December, and has already held talks with Australian aviation 
officials on this matter69. 
At the fishing vessel level, access to Australia raises wider questions about 
security than in the case of New Zealand because of the relative importance of 
Australia to the Western Alliance. Australia's continuing close relationship with the 
United States involves vital security assets and interests on Australian soil and in 
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Australian ports. An agreement allowing Soviet fishing access to the Fremantle or 
Sydney areas would be worrying in the context of United States naval port visits to 
these places. 
Soviet merchant vessels already have regular access to several Australian 
ports, with over 250 visits to Australian ports by Soviet cargo vessels in 1987 alone7o• 
It does not follow however that the presence of an additional 50 vessels per annum can 
be discounted as unimportant. The simultaneous presence of American naval units, 
RAN vessels, and Soviet merchant and fishing vessels in a rapidly escalating crisis 
would not be a pleasant mixture. In this situation it would not be easy for Australia to 
'keep sufficient forces available to track and target all militarily useful Soviet state-
owned vessels'. These vessels could providing ESM (Electronic Support Measures) 
data to Soviet naval headquarters, thus dooming Western assets at the outbreak of a 
conflict71 • In additi~n, it is possible that the Soviet "civilian" fleet could use tactical 
High Frequency analysis and jamming as part of a coordinated effort whereby 
'Australian military HF communications would be completely disrupted without one 
act of physical aggression in Australia'72. 
The use of Soviet fishing vessels to transport Spetsnaz agents en route to the 
sabotage of military assets on Australian soil, especially of the Nurrungar joint facility 
which supplies vital Early Warning information regarding the nuclear intentiond of the 
Soviet Union73, may appear to belong to the realm of fantasy. But uncertainty over 
the size and type of Soviet fishing vessels included in the access proposal does not 
serve to rule out such possible applications. In particlar, if the vessels are similar to the 
Soviet krill trawler seen in New Zealand (the 114m, 6392GRW tonne More 
Lazareva74), the potential to transport operatives in many configurations is worthy of 
consideration. The storage capacity and trawl ramp would not appear to be completely 
unsuitable for operations involving submersibles and a close watch on these vessels by 
the appropriate authorities would be essential in times of crisis. 
The Australian Government's reaction to these concerns has been decidedly 
low-key. While, in Hayden's words, 'Australian national interests, in particular 
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security concerns' may have been 'paramount in the Government's mind'75, during 
the consideration of the Soviet proposals, this has not been evident in the 
Government's public record on the issue. Hayden has accused John Howard of a 
'hysterical relapse into Cold War rhetoric'76, and has described the proposed fisheries 
agreement as a 'fairly inefficient way of putting spies into operation'77. However, 
while Hayden did apparently accept Kamentsev's guarantee that no spies would be 
onboard the Soviet fishing vessels entering Australian ports, he has said that the 
Soviets 'certainly will pick up information if they can '78. 
Defence Minister Beazley has added weight to the Government's argument 
that the Soviet vessels gaining access to Australian ports and facilities are unlikely to 
be carrying extensive electronics fits. In a response to a Parliamentary question he 
stated carefully: 'If the honourable member is talking about intelligence gathering 
vessels, they are u.sually pretty easy to pick. They stand outside ports from which 
American warships operate. They look like fishing vessels but sticking off them are a 
series of antennae that make them pretty easy to discover, if one had the inclination to 
do so. They do not normally hover around with fishing fleets'79. However, the 
honourable member (John Spender), was not asking for information on dedicated 
AGIs, but rather on standard Soviet fishing vessels. 
This points to the crux of the matter to which the Australian Government has 
not done justice publicly. Soviet proposals for extensive access to Australia will never 
result in one of the greatest economic sucess stories for the USSR. What are then the 
secondary Soviet motives in seeking an agreement with Australia? The answer will 
depend on; (i) the types of Soviet fishing vessels which will use the Australian 
servicing facilities, (ii) the port(s) finally chosen for that those facilities and (iii) the 
paths of entry to and exit from Australian waters by the Soviet vessels. 
What is clear is that a fishing agreement with Australia presents the Soviet 
Union with the best opportunity in the region to carry out the fishing fleet's second 
agenda. In South Pacific terms, Australia is the big fish. The relative military 
importance of Australia gives the USSR a good reason for wanting additional civil 
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vessel coverage. In addition, Australia's leadership role in the region is likely to be 
less detrimental to Soviet interests if the Australian Government signs a fishing 
agreement and allows access for Soviet fishing vessels and for Aeroflot. Soviet 
prestige and opportunities for influence in the region will be enhanced, (probably at 
the expense of those of the United States). All of this will do much for the overriding 
Soviet goal in this area of the world, namely, the drive for political legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 6: OTHER SOUTH PACIFIC STATES 
Just as the Soviet Union's efforts in the South Pacific have not been 
concentrated solely upon access for its fishing vessels, proposals regarding the latter 
have not been restricted to the four countries (Kiribati, Vanuatu, New Zealand and 
Australia) specifically covered in this thesis. Because of the Soviet penchant for 
making numerous attention-seeking offers in the fisheries realm, it cannot be said 
with certainty that each and every instance recorded below indicates a serious attempt 
at gaining a fishing agreement, let alone to catch fish! At the same time, the lack of 
success experienced by the Soviet Union in the region prior to 1985 would suggest 
that a positive response from almost any Pacific Island country to a Soviet fishing 
initiative would be followed up in some way by the USSR. 
The Soviet Vnion has been making approaches to SPIS over fisheries access 
for well over a decade now. Early attempts included an offer to the Kingdom of 
Tonga in 1976, when the apparent willingness of the Tongan Government to consider 
Soviet requests for access caused great consternation among the ANZUS states and 
was followed by substantial increases in financial aid from these countries (to 
Tonga)l. In general, though, Soviet approaches in the late 1970s and early 1980s did 
not elicit favourable responses from South Pacific Island governments. The newly 
independent small states tended to be staunchly anti-communist and toed the western 
line. For their part the Soviets did little to help their chances with their unfinished, 
heavy-handed diplomacy and performance in such places as Afghanistan. 
But as South Pacific Island States became less apprehensive about Soviet 
initiatives in the region, the Western fisheries presence was having an opposite 
effect. This was particularly evident in the case of the Ameri(;an Tunaboat 
Association. Kiribati, then, was not the only SPIS in 1985 for whom an agreement 
with the USSR was appealing nor was it the lone radical state in an American lake of 
conformists. 
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Before the Soviets were able to find a willing partner in Kiribati, they had 
approached Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Western Samoa 
for similar fishing access agreements2• The contrast between American performance 
and Soviet promise was presented starkly in the case of the Solomons. The harsh 
American response to the Jeanette Diana incident (see Ch.3) led to United States 
vessels being banned from fishing in the Solomon Islands' Exclusive Economic Zone 
and prompted the Solomon Islands Government to issue 'an open invitation to the 
Soviet Union for negotiations on fishing rights, a proposal it had previously 
rejected'3. 
However, the real acceleration in Soviet efforts seems to have occurred after 
the signing of the Kiribati agreement. In addition to proposals to and eventual success 
with Vanuatu, the USSR has concentrated upon PNG, Fiji and, to a lesser extent, 
Tonga since that time. 
A visit by Soviet Ambassador Samoteikin to Suva in March 1986 was later 
revealed to have included discussions on possible Soviet fishing access to Fiji4. The 
visit coincided quite nicely with the first Soviet cruise liner to calIon Fiji after the 
lifting of the Afghanistan-inspired ban by the Mara Governments. At the Honolulu 
." 
meeting of the Standing Committee of the Pacific Island Conference in July 1986, the 
Fiji Prime Minister cast caution to the wind by announcing that Fiji was now prepared 
to negotiate a fisheries agreement with the USSR, provided that payment for access 
was sufficient, and raised the possibility of shore facilities for Soviet fishing vessels. 
Given Fiji's central political and geographical position in the region and subsequent 
internal political developments, any such moves would have wide significance6. 
Even if Mara's comments were partially attention-seeking, Soviet interest in 
an agreetuent with Fiji was understandably stimulated. At the time of the Fiji Prime 
Minister's statement, the Third Secretary of the Soviet Union's Canberra Embassy, 
Vladimir Valkov, said that the offer n1ade to Fiji at the end of 1984 was still 
standing7• By September, a Soviet delegation was in Fiji for trade talks which 
included the topic of fisheries cooperation between the two countries8. In December 
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1986, Samoteikin stated that with the Vanuatu agreement close to conclusion, the 
USSR was now ready to enter negotiations with Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands9. Included in the Soviet proposals to Fiji was a direct Aeroflot route 
between Suva and Moscow lO• 
Tonga's Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister Crown Prince Tupouto'a 
visited Moscow in February 1986. Soviet officials raised the possibility of a fisheries 
agreement between the two countries11 • Yet, according to lists drawn up by the Forum 
Fisheries Agency, Tonga did not license a single FFV to fish in its EEZ in the 1986/7 
period12 ! Tonga's domestic tuna fleet consists of but one longliner operating out of 
Nuku'alofa13• A Soviet trade delegation which visited Tonga in April 1988 included 
an official from the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries14• Judging on past performance, it is 
most likely that the offer of a fisheries agreement was made to Tonga. In the past the 
Soviet Ministry of fisheries may have had excuses for seeking such an agreement. 
But the need to dispose of excess fishing vessel capacity, and the Ministry's lack of 
knowledge of the fisheries potential in individual Pacific Island EEZs are not 
. 
convincing explanations in the late 1980s (if they ever were). An agreement with 
Tonga cannot be justified on a commercial basis, and it would stretch the imagination 
-, 
to the point of breaking to believe that Soviet negotiators were unaware of this fact. 
But the major prize among the regional states is undoubtedly Papua New 
Guinea. Soviet efforts to gain a fishing agreement with PNG (which can be much 
more easily justified on commercial grounds given the relative richness of PNG 
waters) have been coupled with moves to establish an embassy in Port Morseby. 
Especially in the post-Fiji coup environment, where Fiji's claims to regional political 
centrality, let alone leadership, have been shaken, the USSR's aim to reach small 
SPISs via Papua New Guinea (and Australia) is to be taken as a serious challenge to 
the balance of friendships in the South Pacific. 
In August 1986, the PNG Foreign Minister, Legu Vagi, announced that he had 
asked the Forunl Fisheries Agency to begin fisheries negotiations for PNG with 
several Distant Water Fishing Nations, including the Soviet Union15• This apparently 
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unilateral move came more than eighteen months after the late 1984 Soviet offers to 
PNG and numerous other states in the region. By early 1987, an official PNG 
Government paper was presented to Cabinet setting out costs and benefits involved in 
a fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union16• Deputy Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan 
stated at the time that an Australian company representing Soviet interests had already 
approached PNG to negotiate fisheries access 17• Sir Julius later denied that he had 
contemplated access to PNG waters by licensed Soviet vessels and said that the USSR 
had not made proposals to that effect18. 
It was clear, though, that a PNG-USSR fisheries agreement was a distinct (if 
rather distant) possibility and Soviet representatives were making favourable noises 
on this issue. The Soviet Naval Attache in Tokyo, Captain Nikolai Usov, stated in 
February 1984 that the Soviet Union would be keen to sign a fishing agreement with 
Papua New Guinea1.9• 
However, it was not until after the expiry of the USSR-Vanuatu agreement 
that a Soviet focus on gaining a significant presence in PNG became noticeable. At 
the start of his first official visit to PNG in March 1988, Ambassador Samoteikin 
indicated the Soviet Union's interest in assisting with the development of PNG's 
'" 
fishing and other industries2o. The USSR then made a formal request to the PNG 
Government for an embassy in Port Morseby21, and Samoteikin's visit was followed 
by a trade delegation in April (as per Tonga this included an official from the 
Ministry of Fisheries). Later in March, Sir Julius repeated PNG's willingness to 
consider a fisheries agreeement with the Soviets as long as a 'code of fair play'22 was 
\ 
adhered to. 
While it has been stressed that the PNG Government will allow a Soviet 
fishing and diplomatic presence only under finn constraints23 , the agreement in 
principle by the Namaliu Cabinet to pern1it the establishment of the Soviet Embassy24 
may be the harbinger of glad tidings for the USSR. Papua New Guinea may well have 
strong and valuable ties with neighbouring Australia. But this does not mean that it is 
willing to subordinate its own outlook and course of action to any and every 
80 
perceived western community of effort. This in turn may serve to provide new 
openings for the Soviet Union. According to Michael Somare, the Foreign Minister of 
the Namaliu Government, 'there is no point in criticising a Pacific country for signing 
a fishing deal with the Soviet Union if the critics are not doing anything in the 
region '25. 
Papua New Guinea's stature in the South Pacific is such that any criticism of a 
USSR-PNG fishing agreement is likely to rebound very negatively upon the not-so-
larger critics. Indeed, the Soviets will not be be doing their own cause any harm if 
they support a stronger regional leadership role for Papua New Guinea. 
The Soviet Union's chances for an agreement with Papua New Guinea may 
have been enhanced by the problems encountered by Pacific Island countries with 
Japan's tuna fleet26. The Japanese position on licensing arrangements and fees (in 
particular the continuing refusal to sign a multilateral fishing agreement) has caused a 
similar breakdown in relations as was experience with the United States in the early-
mid 1980s. The omnipresent Ambassador Samoteikin visited the Forum Fisheries 
Agency in April 1989 and an official Soviet delegation (including Ministry of 
Fisheri~~ officials from Vladivostok) will visit Honiara later in 1989 for talks on 
commercial fishing. According to Samoteikin, the USSR is now interested in the 
marine triangle between Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands27. 
Soviet interest in South Pacific fishe11es, despite the poor catches off Kiribati and 
Vanuatu, is destined to continue for some time. 
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CONCLUSION. 
There is no doubt that Soviet fishing has been one of the most visible spheres 
of activity by the Soviet Union in the South Pacific. Despite the many warnings issued 
on the dangers in allowing access for the Soviet fishing fleet, the vessels involved 
appear to have posed few direct threats to the security of South Pacific countries. If 
major coups in the intelligence collection and other security fields have fallen to the 
Soviets, descriptions of them do not appear on the public record. 
Hence, the critics of work such as this would say, the fuss surrounding Soviet 
fishing activity in the South Pacific region has all been for nought. The Soviets want 
fish, we want their money, everyone is happy. Certainly the threat posed by Soviet 
fishing vessels can be and has been exaggerated in some quarters, (although this is 
usually in the fonn . of highlighting one threat at the expense of all others). But there 
are still serious questions regarding the true objectives behind Soviet fishing in the 
South Pacific which demand attention. 
The commercial viability of Soviet fishing, be it in the waters of New Zealand, 
Vanuatu, Kiribati or Antarctic waters, is one such area of doubt. If economic success 
,' .. \ 
is the benchmark for Soviet fisheries development in the era of perestroika, then 
clearly further Soviet efforts around the Pacific Island countries (at least) should not 
be expected. Unless, of course other goals are served by such a fisheries presence. It 
needs to be remembered, for example, that the fishing fleet has established access to 
ports not available to, and spends time in waters not frequented by, the Soviet Navy. It 
thus carries (at least potential) intelligence collection and wartime capabilities into 
previously uncovered (if relatively unimportant) areas. 
Thanks to a few million dollars, years of diplomacy and careful control of 
small fishing fleets, the Soviet Union now has a far more legitimate image in the 
South Pacific. It has an attentive audience to its fisheries proposals. With the promise 
of easy money in financially challenging tin1es, it has a means to apply leverage to 
governments in the region. The prospects for increasing Soviet influence on regional 
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decision-making and for reducing the role of other external powers in the South 
Pacific have been enhanced. 
Soviet fishing activities in this region may have been most unsuccessful in 
terms of catches and financial return. There is no question however that the 
fundamental interests of the Soviet state have been furthered. This, rather than the 
purloining of military secrets, has been the main task for the fishing fleet in the South 
Pacific region. 
~' .. ., 
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APPENDICES. 
TABLE 1.1 : THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA TO 
SOVIET AND WORLD FISHERIES. 
UNFAOAREA 
Description. 1983 
YEAR 
1984 1985 1986 
81 
S-W Pacific. 
71+77 
W+E Central 
Pacific. 
87 
S-E Pacific. 
88 
Pacific 
Antarctic. 
58 
Indian O. 
Antarctic. 
48 
Atlantic O. 
Antarctic. 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
CATCH. 
*Key: 
Source: 
568000* 
0.83* 
15.95* 
8045900 
11.81 
0.11 
6271100 
9.20 
9.81 
10600 
0.02 
55.84 
109700 
0.16 
67.02 
307000 
0.45 
96.50 
68151900 
56800: 
0.83: 
15.95: 
100 
13.15 
584300 571500 733500 
0.79 0.76 0.91 
10.83 11.47 20.83 
8483600 9030000 9297800 
11.51 12.02 11.57 
0.13 0.13 0.16 
8547100 9627000 11951900 
11.60 12.81 14.88 
7.20 6.49 5.95 
800 4700 3900 
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
18.25 NIL 48.31 
35600 31300 37900 
0.05 0.04 0.05 
66.47 90.38 84.21 
225200 228200 462000 
0.31 0.30 0.58 
76.71 82.36 86.00 
73688700 75138000 80345000 
100 100 100 
13.18 12.80 12.86 
Catch by all fleets in tonnes. 
Percentage of total world fishing catch. 
Percentage caught by Soviet vessels. 
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of 
Fisheries Statistics,Vo1.62, 1986,Catches and Landings, 
Rome:FAO,1988. 
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TABLE 1.2 : SOVIET CATCHES OF SELECTED TUNA SPECIES, 
1983-1986. 
Species. 
Skipjack 
Albacore 
Yellowfin 
Bigeye 
Total 
Total as 
Percentage 
of total 
Soviet catch 
Source: 
(In tonnes). 
Year 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
1223 1000 1404 1688 
NIL NIL NIL NIL 
1282 2168 3768 1851 
" 
352 1233 870 1071 
2857 4401 6042 4610 
0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 
, United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of 
Fisheries Statistics, Vol 62, 1986,Catches and Landings, 
Rome:FAO,1988. 
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TABLE 1.3 : SOVIET CATCHES IN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 
FISHERIES, 1983-1986. 
UN FAO AREA 
Description. 
81 
S-W Pacific. 
71+77 
W+E Central 
Pacific. 
87 
S-E Pacific. 
88 
Pacific 
Antarctic. 
58 
Indian O. 
Antarctic 
48 
Atlantic O. 
Antarctic 
TOTAL 
SOVIET 
CATCH. 
" 
1983 
90600* 
0.92* 
10900 
0.11 
615040 
6.27 
5919 
0.06 
73526 
0.75 
296252 
3.02 
9816651 
100 
*Key: 90600:Catch in tonnes 
YEAR 
1984 
63305 
0.60 
8523 
0.08 
605128 
5.71 
146 
<0.01 
23664 
0.22 
172746 
1.63 
10592923 
100 
0.92:Percentage of total Soviet catch. 
1985 
65576 
0.62 
11382 
0.11 
624473 
5.93 
NIL 
NIL 
28290 
0.27 
187955 
1.79 
10522831 
100 
1986 
152787 
1.36 
15072 
0.13 
710891 
6.31 
1884 
0.02 
31916 
0.28 
397361 
3.53 
11259955 
100 
Source: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of 
Fisheries Statistics,Vo1.62, 1986,Catches and Landings, 
Rome:FAO,1988. 
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FIGURE 2.1 : DIVISIONS IN THE NEW ZEALAND EEZ FOR FOREIGN 
FISHING VESSELS. 
K - Korean 
R - Russian 
J - Japanese 
JV - Joint Venture 
re - Reefer 
tr - Trawler 
ps _. Purse Seiner 
sq - Squid 
tl - Tuna longliner 
• orelg 
\ 
Fishi 
Mid-
'{ ~\ I ( 
9 Acti~ity Aro 
ebruaN 1980 
Kermadec Is. 
I 
'I. 
" 
B 
nd N 
25° 
I I 30° 
35° 
I 1 so ~3JreI) ;' b k: 40° I 3 " 
4 JVtr 
3 Ktr 
__ I I r 1 lei 1 .d D ~a~"i Is. J 1 45" 
sq 
JV lqa n. 
JVtr W 'S'Jtr 
I 2 JVtrF 
.: 
The Snares 
c 
Ii 28 tl Bounty Is. I. I 
1 / I.~ ~~"I <1. r Antipode. ::·1 11 1 SOO 
160° 
• 
Auckland I . 
• 
Campbell I. 
165° 170° 
E 
2 Rtr e 
175° 
Source: Catch '80, March 
88 
- 200 Nautic.31 Mile limit 
o 100 200 300 
1--55° 
nautic.31 miles 
between 40° & 550 S 
I 
E1800W 175° 170° 
TABLE 2.1 : SOVIET CATCHES IN NEW ZEALAND WATERS PRIOR TO 
EEZ ESTABLISHMENT (1971-1977). 
(In thousands of tonnes). 
Year Catch 
1971 10.4 
1972 56.8 
1973 74.3 
1974 90.6 
1975 49.2 
'-
" 1976 86.0 
1977 123.0 
Source: New Zealand Fishing Industry Board Report,1978,p.37. 
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TABLE 2.2(a) : SOVIET TRAWL FINFISH CATCH NEW ZEALAND EEZ 
1979-1986. 
(In tonnes) 
EEZ Allocation. Allocation 
Year Area Offered. Accepted Ca tch 
31.3.79 C 
D 
E 
F 
TOT. 
31.3.80 D 
E 
F , 
TOT. 
31.3.81 E 
31.3.82 E 
31.3.83 E 
01.4.83-
30.9.83 E 
30.9.84 E 
30.9.85 E 
30.9.86 E 
8,000 
9,000 
40,000 
3,000 
60,000 
17,000 
100,000 
7,000 
124,000 
32,500 
32,500 
32,500 
15,000 
25,000 
25,000 
25,000 
8,000 
9,000 
40,000 
3,000 
60,000 
10,000 
52,000 
3,000 
65,000 
32,500 
32,500 
23,326 
15,000 
20,000 
11,500 
10,000 
1,521 
8,293 
27,464 
3,040 
40,318 
10,014 
31,444 
846 
42,304 
15,178 
9,430 
19,379 
11,730 
17,347 
10,905 
---10,000 
Source: New Zealand Fishing Industry Board Library, Wellington. 
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TABLE 2.2(b) : SOVIET TRAWL SQUID CATCH NEW ZEALAND EEZ 
1979-1985. 
EEZ 
Year Area 
31.8.79 All 
31.8.80 E 
nonE 
TOT. 
31.8.81 E 
31.8.82 E 
30.9.83 E 
30.9.84 E 
30.9.85 E 
" 
Allocation 
Offered 
15,000 
17,000 
800 
17,800 
10,500 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
8,500 
(In tonnes) 
Allocation 
Accepted 
15,000 
17,000 
800 
17,800 
10,500 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
8,500 
Catch 
14,960 
8,449 
Nil 
8,449 
6,570 
8,019 
9,981 
5,976 
8,406 
Source: New Zealand Fishing Industry Board Library, Wellington. 
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TABLE 2.3 : BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET FISHING VESSELS IN NEW 
ZEALAND WATERS, 1986-1988. 
Vessel Type. 
Large 
Factory 
Trawler/ 
Freezer 
Fish 
Factory 
Trawler/ 
Freezer 
Other* 
TOTAL. 
Key. 
L: Licensed. 
C: Chartered. 
L 
C 
B 
T 
L 
C 
B 
T 
L 
C "-
B 
T 
L 
C 
B 
T 
1986 
6 
0 
2 
8 
6 
5 
3 
14 
3 
0 
0 
3 
15 
5 
5 
25 
B: Both licensed and chartered. 
T: Total. 
Year. 
1987 
2 
0 
4 
6 
3 
4 
2 
9 
2 
1 
0 
3 
7 
5 
6 
18 
Other:Squid Catchers, Fisheries Research Vessels, 
Medium Factory Trawlers and Large Autonomous 
Tra w lerlFreezers. 
1988 
1 
1 
4 
6 
0 
9 
2 
11 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
11 
6 
18 
Total. 
9 
1 
10 
20 
9 
18 
7 
34 
5 
2 
0 
7 
23 
21 
17 
61 
Source: External Assessments Bureau (New Zealand),Port Calls By Soviet 
Vessels, 1986,1987 and 1988. 
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TABLE 2.4: BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET FISHERIES ASSOCIATED 
VESSELS VISITING NEW ZEALAND PORTS, 1986-1988. 
Vessel Type 
Fisheries 
Research 
Ship. 
Passenger 
Liner. 
Refrig. 
Fish 
Transport 
Sealer/ 
Trawler. 
Fisheries 
Training 
Ship 
Fish 
Factory 
Trawlers. 
Total 
Source: 
Year. 
1986 1987 1988 Total 
5 5 5 15 
5 4 2 11 
..,. 
6 6 4 16 
2 2 0 4 
0 1 0 1 
2 2 1 5 
20 20 12 52 
External Assessments Bureau, Port Calls By Soviet Vessels,1986,1987 
and 1988. 
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TABLE 2.5 : NEW ZEALAND PORTS VISITED BY SOVIET FISI-llNG AND 
ASSOCIATED VESSELS, 1986-1988. 
Soviet Soviet 
Fishing Vessels 
Vessels NOT 
Under Under 
Charter Charter 
or or 
PORT License License TOTALS 
Auckland 5(26)* 3(4) 8(30) 
Tauranga 4(12) Nil 4(12) 
Napier 1(2) Nil 1(2) 
Wellington ..... 45(142) 30(104) 75(246) 
Nelson 50(608) 6(73) 56(681) 
Lyttleton 154(1058) 27(137) 181(1195) 
Timaru 8(14) 1(7) 9(21) 
Dunedin 91(265) 10(147) 101(412) 
Bluff 8(16) 2(3) 10(19) 
*Port visits expressed in number of calls and, in brackets, number of days spent. 
Source: External Assessments Bureau,Port Calls By Soviet Vessels, 
1986,1987,1988. 
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TABLE 2.6 : BREAKDOWN OF PORT VISITS BY SOVIET FISHING AND 
ASSOCIATED VESSELS BY OFFICIAL PURPOSE FOR PORT CALL, 1986-
1988. 
Purpose. 
Fuel 
Supplies 
Maintenance/ 
Repairs 
Discharge 
Licensing 
Catch Trans-
shipment. 
Clearance 
' .. ~ 
Crew Change 
Medical 
Evacuation. 
Source: 
Type of Vessel 
Licensed 
or 
Chartered 
NOT 
Licensed or 
Chartered TOTALS 
295 42 
292 46 
55 2 
4 o 
49 7 
47 17 
45 10 
40 15 
3 o 
External Assessments Bureau,Port Visits By Soviet 
Vessels, 1986, 1987,1988. 
95 
337 
338 
57 
4 
17 
64 
55 
55 
3 
jml 
I 
I 
,j 
' I 
" 
I 
I 
I 
I" 
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